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ABSTRACT 
Name suppression is said to be disrupting the winds of open justice. While name suppression 
orders prohibit publication of identifying details of those involved in legal proceedings, open justice 
demands that justice must be manifestly seen to be done. Consequently name suppression is never far from 
controversy - frustration about this area of Jaw frequently pervades all media. 
Section 140 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 provides the court with a broad discretionary power 
to suppress the name of any person accused or convicted of an offence, or of any other person connected 
with the proceedings. It is a difficult balance to strike. While a number of principles have emerged, there 
is a notable amount of inconsistency and divergence in the approach to the exercise of the discretion. 
The aim of this paper is to address three issues surrounding the application of section 140 and 
suggest the direction necessary for reform. Firstly, the application of the section to defendants is 
considered. It is argued that the current approach fails to properly acknowledge the relevance to the 
assessment of both the presumption of innocence and the stage of the proceedings at which the application 
is made. These deficiencies and the lack of legislative guidance are said to be undesirable. Secondly, the 
application of the section to third parties and victims and witnesses is addressed. It is contended that a 
recent decision has unfavourably restricted the ability of the court to offer adequate protection to third 
parties connected to proceedings only by virtue of a relationship to a party to the proceedings. It is also 
argued that the current approach to the application of the section to victims and witnesses is inappropriate. 
Finally, the suitability of the present penalty regime is evaluated. It is argued this regime is inadequate and 
does not provide a meaningful deterrent. It is suggested that a new provision is necessary to better 
recognise the interests at stake and clearly specify the consequences of disobedience. 
This paper takes the position that name suppression does not herald the end of open justice. It 
suggests that while in some instances name suppression is justified, more legislative guidance is needed to 
assist the courts to strike the appropriate balance as to when it will be justified. 
STATEMENT ON WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes , author-suggested 
provisions, bibliography, and appendices) comprises approximately 16,900 words. The provisions created 
by the author which form part of the appendix to this paper have also been included in the main text for the 
convenience of the reader. This approach has been approved by the supervisor of this paper. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
[T]he healthy winds of publicity should blow through the workings of the Courts . .. It is 
important that justice is seen to be done. 1 
Name suppression is never far from controversy. Allegations of inconsistency, 
favouritism towards select groups of society, and general frustration about the lack of 
transparency in this area of law are often said to illustrate that name suppression is 
disrupting the winds of open justice. 2 
The principle of open justice has long been regarded as an essential element of 
our judicial system.3 However this principle is not absolute. The primary object of the 
judiciary is to ensure that justice is done and sometimes open justice must yield to other 
considerations.4 Name suppression orders prohibit publication of identifying details of 
those involved in legal proceedings. This restriction sits uncomfortably with open 
justice. 
Name suppress10n issues have been considered numerous times by different 
organisations.5 The Ministry of Justice and Law Commission are currently undertaking a 
project addressing Criminal Procedure in New Zealand.6 As part of this project, an Issues 
Paper investigating the Suppression of Names and Evidence in Judicial Proceedings was 
1 M v Police ( I 991) 8 CRNZ 14, 15 FisherJ. 
2 
See, for example, Lawyer says All Black's name will have to go from website www.nzherald.co.nz (last 
accessed 27 May 2009); Sensible Sentencing Trust "Family Frustration" (30 April 2008) Press Release; 
and New Zealand Herald Submission on Law Commission Paper dealing with Suppression (submission to 
the New Zealand Law Commission, 2009) where numerous examples from Editorials that have featured in 
its paper over the years are presented. See al so, Simon Mount "The Interface between the Media and the 
Law" (2006) ZLRev 413 , 438-439; and Australian Press Council www.presscouncil.org.au (last accessed 
22 September 2009) which illustrates that this debate is common in other jurisdictions. 
3 
New Zealand Law Commission Suppressing Names and Evidence (NZLC IP13 , Wellington, 2008) 3. 
["Suppressing Names and Evidence"]. 
4 
Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417, 437 (HL) Viscount Haldane. The main justifications for limiting the 
openness ofa court include: protection of the vulnerable; the administration of justice; commercial secrecy; 
and overriding privacy interests. See New Zealand Law Commission Delivering Justice for All: A Vision 
for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals (NZLC R85 , Wellington, 2004) 300. ["Delivering Justice for All"]. 
5 See, for example, Delivering Justice for All, above n 4, and Criminal Law Reform Committee Th e 
Suppression of Publication of Nam e of th e Accused (Report 5, Government Printer, Wellington, 1972). 
6 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 5. 
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produced in December 2008.
7 This paper called for submissions from the public and a 
final report is expected to be presented to Parliament later this year. 
8 The frequency of 
this discussion, coupled with continued public and media frustration, suggest that name 
suppression is an issue that will not easily be blown away. There are a number of 
difficult matters that require clarification and reform. The public and media demand 
more transparency. 
The exclusive focus of this paper is the application of section 140 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985 ("CJA"). Suppression orders made under this section are the most 
commonly encountered in criminal proceedings. The aim of this paper is to directly 
address three principal issues surrounding name suppression in section 140. 
After defining the rights at issue and the current legal framework the three issues 
are addressed in turn. Firstly, the predominant approach to name suppression for 
accused, convicted and acquitted defendants is examined. It is suggested that the broad 
and unfettered discretion in section 140 has resulted in a notable amount of inconsistency 
and divergence in approach and that legislative direction is necessary to clarify 
outstanding issues and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion. Secondly, the 
application of section 140 to persons, other than defendants, who are "connected with 
proceedings" is analysed. It is suggested that a recent case may have unfavourably 
limited the application of section 140 to third parties and that there are sound policy 
reasons to justify that the ability to make such an order should remain. Particular 
attention is also paid to victims and witnesses where it is suggested that the current 
approach to name suppression for these individuals is unsuitable. Finally, the penalty 
regime for breach of suppression orders is evaluated. It is suggested that the regime is 
inadequate and does not provide a meaningful deterrent. After each of the three issues is 
addressed, a new provision is suggested by the author. 
7 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3. 
8 New Zealand Law Commission www.lawcom .govt.nz (last accessed 19 September 2009). The report was 
originally expected to be published in July 2009, but is to now be published in October 2009. 
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II RIGHTS AT ISSUE 
Name suppression 1s an area of law that draws together a diverse range of 
conflicting constitutional rights. Moreover these private and public rights must be 
balanced amid the complex personal circumstances surrounding every name suppression 
application. 
A Open Justice9 
The principle of open justice provides that "Oustice] must manifestly be seen to 
be done". 1° Courts must conduct their business publicly - a position further emphasised 
in criminal proceedings where individual liberty is at stake. 
11 The principle has two 
aspects: 12 
[A]s respects proceedings in the court itself it requires that they should be held in open 
court to which the press and public are admitted and that, in criminal cases at any rate, all 
evidence communicated to the court is communicated publicly. As respects the 
publication to a wider public of fair and accurate reports of proceedings that have taken 
place in court the principle requires that nothing should be done to discourage this. 
Open justice is an important safeguard against judicial bias and unfairness, 
ensuring juciicial accountability: 13 "a judge while judging is himself on trial". 14 It ensures 
that the public can observe the proper administration of justice, accentuating 
9 See also Eric Barendt Freedom of Speech (2 ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005) 338-342 for 
further elucidation of the principle. 
10 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (5 ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 
2005) 325 . 
11 
Claire Baylis "Justice Done and Justice Seen to be Done - the Public Administration of Justice" (1991) 
21 VUWLR 177, 192. 
12 Attorney-Genera/ v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440, 449-450 (HL) Lord Diplock (emphasis 
added). 
13 Ibid . 
14 R v Wharewaka & Ors (8 April 2005) HC AK CRl 2004-092-4373 , para 13 (HC) Baragwanath J. 
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accountability in the judicial system. However the principle is not absolute and must 
sometimes yield to other concerns, such as the right to a fair trial.
15 
While open justice is a well-established common law principle, the right to a fair 
and public trial is affirmed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
16 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("BORA") and the CJA itself.
17 
The other aspect of open justice encapsulates the notion that fair and accurate 
publication of court proceedings should not be suppressed. 
18 This complements the 
rights of freedom of expression and freedom of the press. 
B Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Press 
While both are related, the principle of open justice is more directed towards 
transparency and accountability in the judicial process, whereas the rights of freedom of 
expression and freedom of the press are focussed on the ability of the public and media to 
hear and to report what is happening within the community - particularly where public 
institutions like the judiciary are concemed.
19 
Section 14 of the BORA provides that "everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions 
of any kind in any form."20 This right is also not absolute and subject to "reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
15 Scott v Scott, above n 4, 437 Viscount Haldane. See also, Eric Barendt, above n 9, 339: " ... it would 
make no sense to invoke it [the principle of open justice] when publicity would be inimical to the ends of 
justice it is supposed to promote". 
16 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171, art 14(1). 
17 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(a); and Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 138(1). 
18 Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd, above n 12,450 Lord Diplock. 
19 Xv New Zealand Police (10 August 2006) HC AK CRJ-2006-404-259, para 22 (HC) Baragwanath J. The 
author notes that interestingly one academic has questioned whether the freedom of expression can be 
directly applied to name suppression: Media Law Journal www.medialawjoumal (last accessed 23 
September 2009); and another suggests that categorising the media as having a right to report proceedings 
may be inappropriate: Eric Barendt, above n 9, 341. 
20 The Freedom of Expression is also affirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDR) and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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society."21 While the Court of Appeal has recognised that it is necessary to consider 
whether an order prohibiting publication of a name is a reasonable limitation on the right 
to freedom of expression,22 often it is not considered explicitly as a distinct right separate 
from the principle of open justice. 23 
In conjunction with open justice, freedom of expression confirms the freedom of 
the press to report on judicial proceedings. The media are seen as important players in 
the administration of justice, with a "right to report [on judicial proceedings] fairly and 
accurately as ' surrogates of the public' ."
24 
C Right to a Fair Trial 
The right to a fair trial is affirmed in section 25(a) of the BORA. This right must 
be considered when publicity of a name may prejudice the ability of the court to conduct 
a fair and impartial trial. When there is a significant risk that an individual will not 
receive a fair trial, this right is deemed paramount as it is considered to be a fundamental 
right and central to a free and democratic society: 25 "the issue ceases to be one of 
balancing ... the principles of freedom of expression and open justice must then be 
departed from; not balanced against". 26 
D Presumption of Innocence 
The presumption of innocence is affirmed by section 25(c) of the BORA. A 
relevant consideration in granting name suppression for an accused, as opposed to 
21 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
22 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546, para 43 (CA) Elias CJ for the Court. 
23 Jessica Meech Name Th em and Sham e Them? A Critique of Nam e Suppression Law in New Zealand 
(LLB (Hons) Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2005) 52. 
24 R v Liddell [1995] l NZLR 538 , 546 (CA) Cooke P for the Court . See also , Eric Barendt, above n 9, 
313: "[T]he press should be entitled to report the proceedings for the benefit of the public who cannot, for 
one reason or other, attend them." 
25 Jessica Meech, above n 23 , 11. 
26 R v Burns (Travis) [2002] I NZLR 387, 404-405 (CA) Thomas J. 
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convicted person, is their entitlement to be presumed innocent. 27 When a court considers 
the potential adverse consequences of name publicity, it does so with an appreciation that 
it may be penalising a potentially innocent person.28 
However while the presumption has been recognised as an important 
consideration - and one that must be expressly articulated to avoid being overlooked29 -
it has received inconsistent treatment from the judiciary.30 Similarly, debate outside the 
courts seems to be equally undecided.31 
E Privacy and Other Rights 
There is some support for recognition of "an overlapping public interest... [in] 
human dignity, which has emerged as a fundamental human right and is increasingly 
protected by the evolving right of privacy".32 These factors are said to overlap with the 
presumption of innocence and be a "major interest to be weighed in favour of 
suppression".33 While the author notes that privacy is an emerging tort in New Zealand34 
and may become an important consideration in name suppression, there may be a number 
of difficulties in applying this tort.35 
27 Katrina Jones The Suppression Discretion: Name Suppression Law in New Zealand (LLB (Hons) 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1995) 17. 
28 M v Police, above n 1, 16 Fisher J. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See, for example, Prockter v R (also cited as Proctor v R) [1997] 1 NZLR 295, 298 (CA) Thomas J for 
the Court. " ... [T]he presumption of innocence does not displace the application of the other recognised 
principles." See also Jessica Meech, above n 23, 12; Katrina Jones, above n 27, 17; and Delivering Justice 
for All, above n 4, 316. 
31 Most recently, the Law Commission has reversed its position in relation to the presumption of innocence. 
Compare Delivering Justice for All, above n 4, 316 with Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 29. 
See also Part IV D The Presumption oflnnocence. 
32 R v B [2008] NZCA 130, para 43 (CA) Baragwanath J. See also Media Law Journal 
www.medialawjoumal.co.nz (last accessed 23 September 2009) where it is noted that the Law Commission 
has recognised that "privacy language" is increasingly finding its way into name suppression law. 
33 Xv New Zealand Police, above n 19, para 12 Baragwanath J. 
34 Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). 
35 See, for example, Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 24, where the application of the tort to 
name suppression is questioned: "How can the accused have any privacy rights in respect of the charge 
brought against him or her given that the charge is essentially an allegation of a public wrong?" However, 
the author does suggest that the tort of privacy may have greater force in relation to name suppression for 
victims and witnesses. See, for example, R v W (No 2) (12 November 2004) HC NEL CRI-2004-042-
001663, para 17 (HC) Goddard J. 
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III CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A number of different statutes restrict publication of reports of proceedings and 
permit name suppression orders. 36 In addition to these specific instances, name 
suppression is typically divided into two familiar categories. 
A Civil 
The power of the court to order name suppression in civil proceedings comes 
from the inherent jurisdiction of the court.37 Detailed principles dictating the exercise of 
this power have not yet been elucidated. 38 However, it has generally been accepted that it 
operates on the same principles as the more-developed jurisprudence in criminal 
d
. 39 procee mgs. 
B Criminal 
Sections 138 to 141 of the CJA contain statutory mechanisms designed to provide 
exceptions to the principle of open justice. 40 
I Mandatory/Automatic suppression 
There are a number of instances were suppression is mandatory - rights do not 
need to be balanced before an order is made. 
36 See, for example, Care of Children Act 2004, s 139; Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 
1989, s 438; Coroner' s Act 2006, s 71 ; Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, 
s 25 . Compare, Land Transport Act 1998, s 66 . 
37 Robert Stewart "Suppression and Contempt" in Media Law - Rapid Change, Recent Developments 
(NZLS CLE Seminar 2008) 21 . ["Suppression and Contempt"]. See also , Judicature Act 1908, s 16. 
Moreover, though strictly a creature of statute, it has been held that the District Court has the ability to 
make suppression orders where appropriate: See Brown v Attorney General (Name Suppression) [2006] 
NZAR 450, 452. 
38 Suppression and Contempt, above n 37, 21. 
39 Ibid, citing Clark v Attorney-General (No 1) [2005] NZAR 481 . 
40 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 4. 
15 
Section 139(1) of the CJA prohibits publication of the name or identifying 
particulars of victims of certain sexual offences. Section 139(2) prohibits publication of 
the name or identifying particulars of a person accused or convicted of incest or sexual 
conduct against a dependent family member. Both these prohibitions are subject to the 
court making an order for publication if the victim requests it.41 
Section 139A prohibits publication of the name or identifying particulars of a 
witness in criminal proceedings under the age of 1 7. 
2 Discretionary suppression 
(a) Sections 138 and 14042 
Sections 138 and 140 of the CJA provide the court with discretion to restrict the 
reporting of court proceedings. These orders may be temporary or permanent.43 
Section 138(2) provides that the court may prohibit publication of identifying 
particulars of witnesses where the "interests of justice, or of public morality, or of the 
reputation of any victim of any alleged sexual offence or offence of extortion, or of the 
security or defence of New Zealand so require". 
The focus of this paper is on section 140. This section provides a broad discretion 
to prohibit publication of the name and identifying particulars of any person accused or 
convicted of an offence, or of any other person connected with the proceedings. The 
provision is silent on the circumstances when name suppression should be ordered and 
what considerations should be taken into account. This has been left to the courts. 
41 Criminal Justice Act 1985, ss (lA) and (2A). 
42 See Part X A Appendix Criminal Justice Act 1985, ss 138, 140. 
43 Criminal Justice Act 1985, ss 138(4) and 140(2)-(3). 
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(b) The predominant approach to section 140 
The precedent surrounding section 140 is often inconsistent. While it is possible 
to distil a number of common factors, 44 many of these considerations have been 
inconsistently applied in later cases. The predominant approach however, is easier to 
extract. 
The starting point is the principle of open justice.
45 
This presumption must be 
clearly outweighed46 by "compelling reasons" or "very special circumstances" to justify 
departure from open justice.47 Other considerations such as the triviality of the charge 
and impact of publicity on the particular individual may point towards a suppression 
order, while the possibility of discovering further offending through publishing 
identifying details and the public interest in knowing the true character of the person 
seeking suppression may point against suppression.
48 Factors such as- these are only 
taken into account and are not determinative.
49 
While this is the predominant approach to section 140 in relation to accused or 
convicted defendants, and victims and witnesses at any stage of a case,
50 
a number of 
recent decisions have approached section 140 differently.
51 
44 The leading Court of Appeal authorities are: R v Liddell, above n 24; Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd, 
above n 22; and Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 220 (CA). 
45 R v Liddell, above n 24, 546-7 Cooke P for the Court. 
46 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd, above n 22, para 43 Elias CJ for the Court. 
47 Re Victim X , above n 44, para 37 (CA) Keith J for the Court. 
48 Suppression and Contempt, above n 3 7, 16-17. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, 15. 
51 See, for example, Xv New Zealand Police, above n 19; and Suppression and Contempt, above n 3 7, 15-
16. See also, Part IV E Does the Threshold Differ between the Different Stages of a Case? 
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C A Door Left Ajar? The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court52 
The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is ''the exercise of an ancillary power 
which is not conferred by statute or by rules of court"53 that exists to enable the court to 
act effectively as a court of justice. 54 This power is affirmed by section 16 of the 
Judicature Act 1908. A court may exercise this jurisdiction when it faces an issue it 
cannot address using its powers conferred by statute or the rules of court alone.55 
The question of whether the High Court has inherent jurisdiction outside the CJA 
to grant name suppression in criminal proceedings has been a little vexed. Section 138(5) 
of the CJA states: 
The powers conferred by this section to make orders of any kind described in subsection 
(2) of this section are in substitution for any such powers that a court may have had under 
any inherent jurisdiction or any rule of law; and no court shall have power to make any 
order of any such kind except in accordance with this section or any other enactment. 
A number of different commentators and cases have interpreted this provision to 
mean that the court has no inherent jurisdiction to make the types of orders conferred by 
sections 13 8 to 141. 56 This comes from an understanding that:57 
52 This analysis is limited to discussion of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court (ie, High Court, Court 
of Appeal and Supreme Court). The District Court (and similar judicial bodies), which may also grant 
suppression orders, is a court with jurisdiction conferred by statute. This court possesses only very limited 
inherent powers: see McMenamin v Attorney-General [1985] 2 NZLR 274 (CA). 
53 M v Attorney-General (1997) 15 CRNZ 148, 151 (CA) Henry J for the Court. 
54 Taylor v Attorney-General [1975] 2 NZLR 675,689 (CA) Woodhouse J. For example to support its 
rules of practice, fulfill its judicial functions of administering j ustice according to law, and prevent any 
abuse of its processes. Confirmed on appeal to the Privy Council. 
55 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 44. 
56 Ibid, 44-45. See, for example, R v Appelgren (7 February 1997) HC AK M 51 /97. 
57 Claire Baylis, above n 10, 195, citing R v X (an accused) [ 1987] 2 NZLR 240, 243 (CA) Somers J. See 
also, Rex Woodhouse Pre-judgment Name Suppression in Criminal Cases (LLB (Hons) Research Paper, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 2007) 36; and Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act: A Commenta,y (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) 325-326: "At common Jaw, the superior Courts 
had inherent jurisdiction to control reporting of all proceedings. Section 138(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 
1985 now provides that s 138 of that Act is substituted for the common law jurisdiction in so far as criminal 
proceedings are concerned." 
18 
Sections 138 to 141 of the [Criminal Justice] Act [1985] codify the court's powers to 
make exceptions to the Publicity Principle in the criminal jurisdiction. The Act 
specifically states in section 138(5) that the provisions are in total substitution for the 
inherent jurisdiction which the courts previously commanded, and that the courts have no 
powers other than those conferred by statute to make orders suppressing evidence or 
witnesses names, or excluding the public from hearings: 
The three sections 138, 139 and 140 of the Criminal Justice Act now 
contain the source and scope of the power of a Court to forbid 
publication of material or to exclude persons from the Court in 
proceedings in respect of an offence. 
In the opinion of the author, this interpretation is incorrect. The powers conferred 
by section 138(5) "are in substitution for any such powers that a court may have had 
under any inherent jurisdiction" to make orders of the kind described in section 13 8(2) 
only. 58 Thus, while the scope of the residual jurisdiction may still be unclear, 
59 the ability 
of the court to suppress identifying particulars using its inherent jurisdiction in situations 
outside section 138(2) still remains. Section 138(5) is qualified: it only ousts the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court to make suppression orders of the kind provided by section 
138(2). 
Moreover, this interpretation has recently been affirmed. In Paraha and Ors v 
New Zealand Police, Justice Heath rejected an argument that section 138(5) "operated to 
forbid a Court from making suppression orders that go beyond the scope of section 140," 
noting that there is "no provision in section 140 akin to section 138(5)".
60 He held that: 61 
All that is ousted bys 138(5) is the power of a Court to go beyond the scope of s 138(2) 
and (3) in hearing and determining proceedings that would otherwise be dealt with in 
58 These are orders to clear the court, and suppress evidence, submissions and the names of witnesses. 
59 It is outside the scope of this paper to consider, for example, whether in some instances the court may 
still have inherent jurisdiction to suppress the names of witnesses independent of section 138. Indeed 
interestingly, section 140 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 provides the court with the ability to suppress 
identifying particulars of a witness outside the powers conferred by section 138. Moreover, section 138(9) 
provides that section 138 does not limit the powers of the court under section 140. 
60 Para ha and ors v New Zealand Police (24 April 2008) HC AK CRI 2007-092-5673, para 18 (HC) Heath 
J. 
61 Ibid. paras 39-40 Heath J. 
19 
public. Had Parliament intended to narrow the scope of the inherent jurisdiction in 
relation to suppression orders, it ought to have amended s 140 in a similar way. 
[ .. . ] 
[I]t would be wrong to limit the powers of a District Court or the High Court to make 
orders which have the effect of forbidding certain types of publication in the interests of a 
fair trial. 
While detailed consideration of the parameters and availability of the remaining 
inherent jurisdiction is outside the scope of this paper, the author is of the opinion that 
leaving the door still ajar is advantageous. Any fear of uncertainty in the ambit and 
parameters of the residual jurisdiction can be quelled by an understanding that it is only 
exercised in limited and exceptional circumstances. It must be inherently flexible to 
address issues that may arise which cannot be dealt with using only statutory powers or 
rules of the court. Complete codification to eliminate this jurisdiction in the interests of 
certainty removes this "measure of flexibility which may be significant when unforeseen 
· · ,, 62 ctrcumstances anse . 
IV SECTION 140: DISTILLING THE PROPER APPROACH FOR 
DEFENDANTS 
A Introduction 
Section 140 of the CJA provides the court with the power in criminal proceedings 
to suppress the name of a defendant - whether accused, convicted or acquitted. This 
discretion is broad and unfettered. 
The suggestion that a defendant be granted name suppression often sits as 
uneasily with the public as it does with the principle of open justice. However in some 
instances a departure from open justice is necessary, for example, to avoid the risk of an 
unfair trial or where publication may cause hardship to a defendant that is so severe and 
62 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 45. See, for example, Taylor v Attorney-General, above n 
54. 
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disproportionate that their name ought to be suppressed. 
63 Name suppression 1s a 
difficult area of law: important individual rights must be balanced against equally 
important public rights and the public interest amidst complex fact situations. The 
difficulty for the judiciary is to strike the appropriate balance each time. 
This portion of the paper addresses a number of issues surrounding the application 
of section 140 to accused, convicted or acquitted defendants. The current lack of 
legislative guidance is first addressed, followed by analysis of the predominant approach, 
the place of the presumption of innocence and the significance of the often distinct 
considerations relevant at different stages of a case. 
B The Need for More Guidance 
1 Silence is unhelpful 
Section 140 is silent on the circumstances when name suppression should be 
ordered and what considerations should be taken into account in the exercise of the 
discretion. The lack of guidance from the legislature is unhelpful; it is a difficult enough 
balance to strike. 
Many principles of name suppression are now well established.
64 While some of 
these principles may be reiterated instinctively in each name suppression case, their 
familiarity does not detract from the need for more guidance, nor does it suggest that any 
legislative direction would just restate the obvious - a good provision would go further 
than simple codification of the common law position and help provide a framework for 
63 Roberts v Police (1989) 4 CRNZ 429, 431 (HC) Wylie J. See also M v Police, above n 1, 15 Fisher J. 
64 See, for example, Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd, above n 22, para 42 Elias CJ for the Court; R v Liddell, 
above n 24, 546-7 Cooke P for the Court; and Suppression and Contempt, above n 37, 16-17. For example, 
(generally) pointing towards suppression: whether the person is acquitted or convicted; the seriousness of 
the offending; possible adverse impacts upon rehabilitation prospects; the potential for significant adverse 
impacts upon personal , financial and professional interests. For example, pointing against suppression: the 
prima facie presumption is always in favour of openness; the media have a right to report proceedings fairly 
and accurately as surrogates of the public; and concerns such as the possibility of suspicion falling unfairly 
on others, the public interest in knowing the true character of the person seeking suppression, issues of 
public safety and the possibility of discovering further offending or victims and witnesses. 
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the exercise of the judicial discretion. Most importantly perhaps, the direction would 
resolve some difficult outstanding issues and clarify the approach to section 140. Put 
simply, it would help the courts to strike the appropriate balance. 
Notwithstanding that many principles appear to be well established, there is a 
notable amount of disparity as to the proper approach to the exercise of the discretion. 
Moreover, those that do adopt an analogous approach often state it differently. This 
divergence may be a result of the broad discretion and lack of direction provided by the 
legislature. It is time that the approach is clarified. Indeed the Law Commission has 
recognised "there is considerable merit in the idea of setting out the grounds on which 
name suppression may be granted in legislation".65 A level oflegislative direction would 
assist the judiciary and help increase transparency and certainty for the public. While 
absolute consistency may be unattainable and a level of discretion must always be 
maintained that acknowledges every case is different, there is a real interest in more 
guidance. 
2 No need for a fettering code ' but a real interest in more guidance 
In R v Liddell ("LiddelI'') , the Court of Appeal held that it would be 
"inappropriate for this Court to lay down any fettering code" to constrain the exercise of 
the discretion provided by section 140. Other decisions have reiterated this statement and 
recognised that any mandate for change must come from Parliament.66 
A decision to grant name suppression is an exercise of judicial discretion and can 
only be disturbed if "[the decision made was] based on some wrong principle or 
otherwise shown sufficiently clearly to be wrong." 67 As appeal rights are therefore 
limited, there is a real interest to ensure applications for name suppression are determined 
65 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 19 . 
66 See, for example, Re Victim X , above n 44, (HC) para 42 Hammond J: " . .. one would have thought that a 
parliamentary mandate for widespread change was required ." 
67 R v Liddell, above n 24, 545 Cooke P for the Court. See also, M v Police, above n I, 16 Fisher J: " .. . I 
should intervene only if there has been an error of principle or if the Judge has taken into account matters 
which should have been excluded or has failed to take into account relevant matters or if his decision is 
plainly wrong." 
22 
correctly first time. In most instances these applications are determined by lower courts 
which have faced allegations of inr,onsistency. 
68 
Whilst a degree of flexibility must remain, more legislative direction in section 
140 can help increase consistency by signalling the appropriate balance to be struck 
between the rights of a defendant and the public interest in open justice and freedom of 
expression. While there is no need for a fettering code, there is a real advantage in more 
guidance. It must be clear that the identifying particulars of a defendant are to be 
suppressed only where necessary and it must be made clearer when this is necessary. 
C Stages of a Case 
1 Introduction 
When a person is charged - either wrongly or rightly - with a criminal offence a 
continuum begins. The gamut can be broken down into three stages: 
69 pre-trial 
(including the initial stage following arrest but before the first court appearance); at trial, 
but before conviction or acquittal; and post-trial, after conviction or acquittal. Name 
suppression can become an issue at any stage and remain a live issue. 
An application for name suppression during any stage must balance the public 
interest and the principle of open justice against the private rights and interests of a 
defendant. While this balance must be struck at every stage, the considerations that are 
relevant at each stage may differ. Section 140 does not explicitly distinguish between the 
different stages of a case. In Prockter v R ("Prockter"), the Court of Appeal held that the 
principles in Liddell applicable to name suppression applied both before and after trial.
70 
While there has been some recognition of the considerations relevant at different stages 
68 See, for example, New Zealand Herald, above n 2. 
69 Herein, for the purposes of convenience, referred to as the "stages of a case". Often, they have been 
demarcated further - see Part IV C 2 (c) At trial , but before conviction or acquittal. See also R v B, above n 
32, para 25 Baragwanath J. 
70 Prockter v R, above n 30, 298 Thomas J for the Court. See also, Suppressing Names and Evidence, 
above n 3, 30 where a recent, albeit tentative, view of the Law Commission was that there should not be a 
different approach to name suppression at the pre-trial stage/s. 
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of a case71 (and practically name suppression has more commonly been granted at the 
pre-trial stage than it has during and after trial72), the predominant approach has remained 
the same at all stages: the presumption of open justice73 must be clearly outweighed74 by 
"compelling reasons" or "very special circumstances" to justify departure from open 
· · 75 JUSt1ce. 
Recently, there has been burgeoning support from a number of decisions 
favouring a different approach that takes into account the stage of the case when an 
application for name suppression is made.76 It has been suggested that these decisions 
"must be regarded as an attempt to 'loosen' the strict Court of Appeal tests" .77 While this 
may be the beginning of "different horses for different courses",78 at the very least it 
illustrates that the significance to be placed on the stage of the case in the exercise of the 
discretion has received inconsistent treatment. 
2 The different stages of a case79 
(a) Pre-trial (including the initial stage following arrest, but before the first court 
appearance) 
71 See, for example, Prockter v R, above n 30, 298 Thomas J for the Court . 
72 See, for example, Suppression and Contempt, above n 37, 15 . 
73 R v Liddell, above n 24, 546-7 Cooke P for the Court . 
74 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd, above n 22, para 43 Elias CJ for the Court. 
75 Re Victim X , above n 44, para 37 (CA) Keith J for the Court. 
76 Suppression and Contempt, above n 3 7, 15 . See, for example, X v New Zealand Police, above n 19; GAP 
v New Zealand Police (23 August 2006) HC ROT CRl-2006-463-68 ; J v Serious Fraud Office (10 October 
2001) HC AK.L Al26/0l ; Nobilo v New Zealand Police (17 August 2007) HC AK.L CRl 2001-404-241 ; 
and R v B, above n 32. 
77 Suppression and Contempt, above n 37, 16. 
78 Ibid, 15. 
79 Demarcating the stages of a case into three distinct periods is a little artificial as they are continuously 
related. For example, Part (c) "At trial , but before conviction or acquittal" should be read with the 
understanding that suppression at this stage would as a matter of course likel y al so include suppression at 
the pre-trial stage, Part (a) "Pre-trial (including the initial stage following arrest, but before the first court 
appearance)". The stages are isolated into discrete periods to emphasise that different considerations 
appear to operate during each period which may affect the balance to be struck in the exercise of the 
discretion to grant name suppression under section 140 at each particular stage. 
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There are no legislative restrictions on publication of identifying particulars of 
individuals arrested, but who have not yet appeared in court. At this stage there can be 
no suppression order to prohibit publication and the principal of open justice may have 
less force. 80 Typically, the particulars of a person arrested for, or charged with, an 
offence are not published before that offender appears in court.
81 However publication of 
such detail does not breach any code of practice or legislative provision. 
82 
Publication of the name of a person arrested for, or charged with, an offence 
before they appear in court should be prohibited. Publication of their details pre-empts 
their right to apply to the court for name suppression. It has been suggested that since 
such an action prejudices the ability of the court to grant an application for name 
suppression, publication of the name of an accused before their first appearance may be a 
contempt of court. 
83 
In 2004 the Law Commission recommended that "publication of identifying 
details of a person charged with an offence before they appear in court should be 
prohibited unless the person consents" . 
84 In the opinion of the author, this 
recommendation should be enacted as it promotes certainty and natural justice and 
protects the right of an individual to apply to the court for name suppression. 
After this period, it is likely that there may also be a significant period of time 
following the first court appearance but before trial. It has been noted that "pre-trial 
publicity may be ill-informed and perhaps unjustified ... There is the natural justice 
80 Delivering Justice for All, above n 4, 314. 
81 Ibid, 313 . See also, New Zealand Police "All Media Please Note" (19 September 2009) Press Release: 
"The police officer named in the NZ Herald on page 6 today [Drink-drive inquiry policeman charged 
www.nzherald.co.nz (last accessed 20 September 2009)] has not appeared in court yet and therefore has 
name suppression until he does. He has been summonsed to appear in the Auckland District Court on 
September 30." interestingly this statement seems to assume the officer in question has name suppression 
automatically - without court order - from the time he was arrested until his first court appearance. 
82 Delivering Justice for All, above n 4, 314. 
83 C v Wilson and Horton Ltd (27 May 1992) HC AK CP 765/92. In this case, an interim injunction was 
granted to prevent publication of the name of a man under investigation by the Serious Fraud Office. 
Williams J found that there was a serious question to be tried as to whether such publication might give rise 
to a contempt of court. See also, Burrows and Cheer, above n 10, 343. 
84 Delivering Justice for All, above n 4, 314. 
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consideration that the accused has not had an opportunity to present the defence case". 85 
The author is of the opinion that, where appropriate, pre-trial name suppression may 
more readily be justified given that at this stage an accused is entitled to the presumption 
of innocence, and the potential for disproportionate adverse harm to be suffered from 
publicity at this stage is more significant. 86 However, as the case proceeds from this 
point, suppression may no longer be justified.87 
(b) Post trial, after conviction or acquittal 
If convicted, the onus on a defendant wishing to obtain name suppression 1s 
· · 88 d significant - especially for a senous cnme. An or er "will not be made unless the 
circumstances are quite exceptional"89 or there are compelling reasons to justify it. 90 
If acquitted, name suppression is not axiomatic. While the Court of Appeal has 
held that the discretion may more readily be exercised, it has also found that there may be 
legitimate public interest in publication of identifying particulars of an individual 
acquitted. 91 It has been argued that it seems unfair the same threshold applies to an 
acquitted person applying for name suppression as it does to a convicted person -
especially considering publicity can be a significant punishment and often acquittals are 
not as widely publicised by the media. 92 A later observation in Liddell illustrates the 
appropriate direction that should be taken at this stage:93 
85 R v B, above n 32, para 27 Baragwanath J. 
86 Xv New Zealand Police, above n 19, para 22 Baragwanath J . 
87 See Part IV F Critique. 
88 R v Liddell, above n 24, 54 7 Cooke P for the Court: " . .. when a conviction is for [a] serious crime it can 
only be very rarely that the interests of the offender' s family will justify an order suppressing disclosure . . . 
of identity". 
89 Delivering Justice for All, above n 4, 317. 
90 Re Victim X , above n 44, para 37 (CA) Keith J for the Court. 
9 1 R v Liddell, above n 24, 54 7 Cooke P for the court. For an example of a case where suppression was 
refused following acquittal because of the public interest see R v Dare (25 June 1998) CA 195-98 (CA). 
See also, R v D(G) (1991) 63 CCC (3d) 134. 
92 See, for example, Fiona Jackson What 's in a name? Name Suppression and the Need for Public Interest 
(LLB (Hons) Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2005) 35-36. 
93 R v Liddell, above n 24, 547 Cooke P for the Court (emphasis added). 
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A case of acquittal . . . where the damage caused to the accused by publicity would 
plainly outweigh any genuine public interest, is an instance when, depending on all the 
circumstances, the jurisdiction could properly be exercised. 
( c) At trial, but before conviction or acquittal 
The approach to be taken during the middle of the continuum is more contentious. 
Two proposals have been suggested. 
(i) Suppression until the substance of the case has been ' gone into ' 
In 1972 the Criminal Law Reform Committee proposed legislation that precluded 
publication of identifying particulars of an accused until the case had been "gone into".
94 
This was presumptive only and exceptions were provided to allow for publication: where 
an accused sought such an order; where it may lead to other victims and witnesses 
coming forward; where it was necessary to avoid others suffering through speculation; or 
where it was otherwise in the interests of justice. 
95 
There are a number of advantages to this approach. It avoids the difficulty 
surrounding the relevance of the presumption of innocence in name suppression
96 and 
promotes certainty and equal treatment. Similarly, it avoids the "dilemma" facing an 
accused seeking name suppression under the current law "knowing that the threshold ... is 
a high one and the possibility that the application itself, if unsuccessful, may attract the 
very consequence it sought to avoid."
97 There are also disadvantages. An acquitted 
individual would be in the same position as they are under present law and the restriction 
limits freedom of expression and open justice. While this is a notable limitation, it is 
94 In summary cases, the point after which the prosecution has presented its case or the accused has pleaded 
guilty. In cases where an accused is to be tried by a jury, at the taking of depositions at a preliminary 
hearing. Delivering Justice For All, above n 4, 315. 
95 Ibid. 
96 See Part IV D The Presumption oflnnocence. 
97 Delivering Justice For All, above n 4, 316. 
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only temporary, as the public interest in knowing the name of a person appearing before 
the court is "simply postponed" until the substance of the case is presented.98 
In 2004 the Law Commission recommended this proposal be adopted, but this 
recommendation was not accepted by the Government. 99 While the Government 
response may have been unfavourable, this proposal still has some enduring support. 100 
(ii) Suppression until conviction 
An alternative suggested by the Criminal Law Reform Committee, was a 
prohibition on publication until conviction. This alternative was less favoured by the 
Committee than the first, as it was said to place too much paramountcy on the 
presumption of innocence and significantly infringe open justice and freedom of 
expression. 101 Moreover, this may have had the practical effect of precluding any 
publication of the name of an acquitted individual. 
Arguments in favour of this proposal focused on the effect that merely being 
accused of a crime can have on the reputation and livelihood of an individual. Moreover, 
this proposal accords with the view that publicity is a punishment and should be reserved 
for only those deserving to be reprimanded.102 Proponents point out these effects may 
continue even if an accused is later acquitted and that publicity following an acquittal "is 
rarely as extensive" as publicity surrounding the original appearance before the court. 103 
Similarly, the proposal is said to promote certainty and equal treatment of every person 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ministry of Justice Government Response to Law Commission Report on Delivering Justice for All 
(Government Printer, Wellington, 2004). 
100 Butler and Butler, above n 57, 329. " In the authors ' view these [referring as well to the recommendation 
discussed in Part IV C 2 (a) Pre-trial (including the initial stage following arrest, but before the first court 
appearance)] recommendation [sic] are a step in the ri ght direction since at these points in time more harm 
can be done to the accused and his [sic] family than there is a public interest in knowing his or her name." 
101 Delivering Justice For All, above n 4, 315 and 31 7. Moreover it would have the ' practical difficulty' of 
making any accompanying reporting of the trial more difficult. 
102 Jessica Meech, above n 23 , 67. 
103 Delivering Justice For All, above n 4, 317. See also, M v Police, above n 1, 16 Fisher J: "[T]he stigma 
associated with a serious allegation will rarely be erased by a subsequent acquittal". 
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accused of a crime, whereas under the present law "only some people [are] ever likely to 
. h b fi f . " 104 gam t e ene its o name suppression . 
While both proposals of the Committee were never implemented, a prov1s10n 
having the same effect as the second proposal was later enacted, 
105 albeit only in force 
from September 1975 until July 1976.
106 
(iii) The quandary with the 'before conviction or acquittal' period 
Much of the debate (and indeed difficulty) surrounding this stage has concerned 
the relevance of the presumption of innocence to name suppression. The tendency for 
name suppression to be more readily granted before, as opposed to after, conviction is 
often attributed to the importance of the presumption. In M v Police ("M'), Fisher J 
held: 107 
[O]ne must recognise a crucial difference between the approach which is appropriate 
where the defendant is merely charged with an offence and the approach where he or she 
has been convicted. Publication of name is frequently a major and appropriate element of 
an offender's punishment once it is established that he or she is guilty. But punitive 
considerations are obviously irrelevant before conviction. At that stage the defendant is 
entitled to the presumption of innocence. Yet the stigma associated with a serious 
104 Delivering Justice For All, above n 4, 317. 
105 Criminal Justice Act 1954, s 45B (now repealed). This provision was introduced by the Labour 
Government in its Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1975. It overturned the presumption of openness at 
the pre-trial stage and provided that unless the court ordered otherwise, there was to be no publication of 
the names or identifying particulars of an accused, unless and until that person was found guilty and a 
conviction was entered by the court. Hon Dr AM Finlay (16 September 1975) 401 NZPD 4475: " [T]o say 
that there should be publicity because it is part of the penalty is to assume guilt right from the moment the 
argument is embarked upon". See also, Michael Stace "Name Suppression and the Criminal Justice 
Amendment Act 1975" (1976) 16 Br J Criminol 395. 
106 Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1976, s 2 (now repealed) . This provision was introduced by the new 
incoming National Government (having successfully defeated the Labour Government in the November 
1975 election) and repealed section 45B of the Criminal Justice Act 1954. The National Party, both before 
and after the enactment of section 45B, had expressed its hostility towards the provision and intimated its 
intention to repeal the provision when elected to government. The party strongly subscribed to the opinion 
that "justice must be done openly and in public" and that society's right to know was more important than 
an individual ' s well-being in this context. See, for example, Rt Hon Sir John Marshall (17 April 1975) 396 
NZPD 682; Hon RD Muldoon (16 September 1975) 401 NZPD 4478: "We will reverse the decision next 
year - that 1 promise ... "; and Michael Stace, above n 105, 396-399 . 
107 M v Police, above n 1, 15- 16 Fisher J. 
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allegation will rarely be erased by a subsequent acquittal. Consequently when a Court 
allows publicity which will have serious adverse consequences for an unconvicted 
defendant, it must do so in the knowledge that it is penalising a potentially innocent 
person. That is far from saying that suppression should always be granted before guilt is 
established. But in my view the presumption of innocence and risk of substantial harm to 
an innocent person should be expressly articulated in these cases to avoid the danger that 
they will be overlooked. 
This finding has been referred to affirmatively in a number of other cases 108 
which "[take] the view that the principles to be applied in the application of the discretion 
under s 140 of the Act [are] different prior to conviction [ than they are] after 
conviction". 109 However this is not a view shared by all - some suggest the presumption 
is incapable of displacing the principle of open justice and right to freedom of expression 
before trial 110 or that it is completely irrelevant to name suppression decisions. 111 The 
· h · d · · 112 presumpt10n as receive mcons1stent treatment. 
D The Presumption of Innocence 
Section 25(c) of the BORA provides that everyone who is charged with an 
offence has, in relation to the determination of the charge, the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law. While the language of the BORA is clear, 
the application of the presumption to name suppression has been a difficult question, 
indeed the "reconciliation of the presumption of innocence with the presumption of open 
. . . h . I ,,113 Justice 1s somew at controversia . 
108 See, for example, S(J) and S(2) v Police (1995) 12 CRNZ 714, 717 (HC) Neazor J. 
109 "A Defendant " v Police (1997) 14 CRNZ 579, 583 (HC) Doogue J. 
110 Prockter v R, above n 30, 299 Thomas J for the Court: "But it is to be emphasised that the presumption 
of innocence [ while able to be taken into account] does not in itself displace the application of the 
principles in R v LiddelI". 
111 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 29. 
112 Compare, for example, Prockter v R, above n 30, and T v Police (7 June 2005) HC CHCH CRI-2005-
409-000098. See also, Jessica Meech, above n 23, 23-29; Bickley v Police (3 October 1991) HC CHCH AP 
224/91; and Katrina Jones, above n 27, 25 where, after noting the inconsistency, the author said: "Jt appears 
the judiciary has passed the resolution of a difficult issue [the relevance of the presumption of innocence] 
onto the legislature. This should be an indication to the legislature that the controversial issue of name 
suppression principles demands debate in parliament for clarification as opposed to it remaining with an 
unwilling judiciary." 
113 Burrows and Cheer, above n 10, 338. 
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1 Conflicting authorities 
Precedent concerning the presumption of innocence in name suppression reveals 
it has been inconsistently applied. While many cases following M have given the 
presumption much prominence in the balance to be struck prior to conviction, 
114 the 
Court of Appeal held in Prod1er: 
115 
We have no doubt that the principles in R v Liddell referred to above apply to the 
question of name suppression both before and after trial and that those principles remain 
the starting point in considering any application for name suppression. The key difference 
is that, whereas the presumption of innocence is not relevant following a conviction, it is 
undoubtedly a factor which must be taken into account when the question arises before 
trial What weight the presumption of innocence is then to be given will depend on the 
particular circumstances of the case. But it becomes a significant factor to be weighed in 
the balance against the principles which favour open reporting. 
[ ... ] 
But it is to be emphasised that the presumption of innocence does not in itself displace 
the application of the principles in R v Liddell. 
Prod1er has been interpreted to have accorded the presumption less weight than 
it received in M. However many cases since Prockter appear to have deviated from this 
view 116 and found that the presumption is a material factor in the balance that must be 
stuck in pre-trial name suppression.
117 In 2004 the Law Commission observed that it was 
"difficult to discern from the decisions after Proctor the weight to be given to the 
presumption of innocence and in what circumstances the balance will tilt". 
11 8 It 
expressed concern that "since the decision in Proctor v R, 
119 the law relating to pre-trial 
suppression of an accused' s name [does] not appear to have given sufficient recognition 
114 See, for example, S(J) and S(2), above n 108. 
115 Prockter v R, above n 30, 298-299 Thomas J for the Court (emphasis added). 
116 See, for example, Serious Fraud Office v B & K [ 1999] DCR 621 (DC); Wellington Newspapers v XI 
[2000] DCR 161 (DC); J v Serious Fraud Office, above n 76; R v B, above n 32; GAP v Police, above n 76; 
and X v New Zealand Police, above n 19. 
11 7 Delivering Justice For All, above n 4, 315. 
11 8 Indeed since the expression of this view in 2004 more cases have placed real significance on the 
presumption of innocence - see, for example, R v B, above n 32; GAP v Police, above n 76; Nobilo v 
Police, above n 76; and X v New Zealand Police, above n 19. 
119 Procl.'ter v R, above n 30. The case is referred to in some reporter series as Proctor v R. 
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to the presumption of innocence". 120 Indeed this was a sentiment shared by some 
members of the judiciary. 121 
In the opm1on of the author, the authorities are not necessarily irreconcilable. 
Prockter notes that the presumption is a "significant factor to be weighed" against open 
justice, that it may be afforded great weight "depend[ing] on the particular 
circumstances" and that it is "undoubtedly a factor which must be taken into account" in 
pre-trial applications. 122 While Prockter goes further and clarifies that the presumption 
"does not in itself displace the application of the principles in R v LiddelI"123 this is not 
inconsistent with authorities that have considered the presumption a more material 
factor. 124 Those authorities do not assert that the presumption alone ' tips the scales ' 
towards suppression, but that it must be a factor considered important - with others - in 
the balancing exercise. 125 The author suggests that the difficulty is not a perceived 
inconsistency of these authorities with the decision in Prockter, but just that the 
presumption has often not received sufficient consideration in some cases. 
2 Law Commission and the difficulty with the presumption of innocence 
In 2008 the Law Commission reversed its 2004 position on the relevance of the 
· 126 presumption: 
120 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 29. See also Claire Baylis, above n 11 , 211 : "The affects 
of publicity can be a very severe punishment which is not imposed by Parliament and the courts, and which 
can affect people even before their case has been decided . The presumption of innocence has been 
disregarded in this area." 
12 1 See, for example, XvNew Zealand Police, above n 19, para 11 Baragwanath J: " .. . this interest has 
sometimes received limited attention"; R v B, above n 32, para 41 Baragwanath J where the same statement 
was made; and S(J) and S(2) , above n 108, 718 Neazor J: " ... too much weight was given in the District 
Court to the primacy of publicity and not enough to the presumption of innocence." 
122 Prock/er v R, above n 30, 298 Thomas J for the Court. 
123 Ibid, 299 Thomas J for the Court. 
124 See, for example, Serious Fraud Office v B & K, above n 116; Wellington Newspapers v XI, above n 
116; J v Serious Fraud Office, above n 76; R v B, above n 32; GAP v Police, above n 76; and X v New 
Zealand Police, above n 19. See also, Delivering Justice For All, above n 4, 315. 
125 Indeed if it did tip the scales alone, these authorities would stand for the proposition that all accused 
persons are entitled to suppression until conviction (as all are entitled to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty). These decisions do not assert this and suppression until conviction is not the law in New Zealand. 
126 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 29 . 
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[The Law Commission] now takes the view that the presumption of innocence is not 
relevant to name suppression decisions. The presumption of innocence is a rule about 
how trials are run. In effect, it is shorthand for the legal protections that apply to accused 
persons within the justice system, including the right to silence and the right to have 
charges proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It does not imply that for all purposes the 
accused is to be treated as factually innocent of the charge. If that were the case, few 
accused would be remanded in custody pending trial. 
The problem with the relevance of the presumption is that a charge does not 
legally imply guilt - publicity about a charge can only lead people to make their own 
inferences of factual guilt which may strictly not offend the presumption of innocence.
127 
Instead it has been suggested that the reason why open justice is more readily offset - and 
name suppression more likely granted - before, rather than after, conviction is because 
the potential for hardship to be suffered by an accused from publicity at this stage is 
greater than the potential for hardship after conviction or acquittal.
128 
In the opinion of the author, the 2008 view of the Commission is misguided; the 
presumption of innocence has real relevance in name suppression. 
3 Relevance of the presumption of innocence 
The presumption of innocence is much more than a procedural "rule about how 
trials are run". Although the presumption appears in section 25 of the BORA under the 
heading "minimum standards of criminal procedure", it is described as a right in that 
section and understood to be a right (as opposed to merely a rule) that every individual 
has affirmed by the BORA. Section 25 extends to other minimum standards of criminal 
procedure, including the right to a fair and public hearing, 
129 and these other provisions 
are similarly understood to be affirming rights. 
127 Indeed as Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 25 notes: "[I]f the media were to suggest that a 
person who had been charged, but not convicted of an offence, was guilty, they would be liable for 
contempt, and risk defamation proceedings in the event of an eventual acquittal". 
128 Ibid, 29. 
129 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(a). 
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The importance and purposes of the presumption are well articulated m the 
Supreme Court of Canada decision, R v Oakes: 130 
The presumption of innocence protects the fundamental liberty and human dignity of any 
and every person accused by the State of criminal conduct. An individual charged with a 
criminal offence faces grave social and personal consequences, including potential loss of 
physical liberty, subjection to social stigma and ostracism from the community, as well as 
other social , psychological and economic harms. In light of the gravity of these 
consequences, the presumption of innocence is crucial . It ensures that until the State 
proves an accused's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, he or she is innocent. This is 
essential in a society committed to fairness and social justice. The presumption of 
innocence confirms our faith in humankind; it reflects our belief that individuals are 
decent and law-abiding members of the community until proven otherwise. 
Moreover, the importance of the presumption is emphasised by its application to 
all stages of the criminal justice process. While some commentators have suggested "the 
presumption can only sensibly have application at trial", 131 the presumption has been held 
to be relevant "not only to an accused ' s position during trial , but, equally .. . relevant to 
pre-trial matters (such as bail), post-trial matters (such as sentencing) and even to the 
substantive content of offences". 132 Indeed as Baragwanath J observed in R v B and Xv 
New Zealand Police: 
It is of interest to compare the case of bail. Although other considerations may cause bail 
to be declined, because of the presumption of innocence the penalty of being detained is 
the subject of a powerful adverse presumption both at common law ... and under s 7 of 
the Bail Act 2000. While often determinative in bail cases, in suppression applications 
this interest has sometimes received limited attention .
133 
130 R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200, 212-213 (SCC) Dickson CJ for the majority. 
131 Butler and Butler, above n 57, 827. See also Claire Baylis, above n 11 , 203 . 
132 Butler and Butler, above n 57, 827. See also, Bron McKillop "The Position of Accused Persons under 
the Common Law System in Australia (More Particularly in New South Wales) and the Civil Law System 
in France" (2003) 26 U NSWLR [2003) 515 where it is recognised that the presumption of innocence "is of 
importance in relation to pre-trial matters such as prejudicial media reporting and entitlement to bail.,i 
133 R v B, above n 32, para 41 Baragwanath J. 
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Certainly physical detention is a more potent interference with human dignity than 
something that is said. But reputation matters. The indignity of subjection to the 
criminal process, which is part of the deterrent of being proved to have offended, 
should 11ot follow simply as of course at a stage when the offence has not been 
proved. 134 
The demarcation between factual and legal guilt is not as distinct in the real world 
as it may appear in legal texts 
135 
- this is a further reason why the presumption is 
important and has real relevance in name suppression. The effects of publicity can be a 
"very severe punishment which is not imposed by Parliament and the courts, and which 
can affect people even before their case has been decided".
136 While the rhetoric of the 
justice system "is that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty, the 
punishment of publicity can be meted out before a verdict is reached, with often long 
lasting effects." 137 It must be considered whether this harmful publicity, "like the rest of 
the punishment, should be reserved for those who have been proved guilty of the 
crime".138 If an accused is later acquitted they can already have suffered severely from 
the adverse publicity.
139 Moreover, "acquittals are often not widely publicised, and some 
people may think that the person was guilty, but somehow managed to get off on a 
134 Xv New Zealand Police, above n 19, para 25 Baragwanath J (emphasis added). 
135 The author notes that while the Law Commission did recognise this point, it was not considere
d in great 
detail : Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 29. 
136 Claire Baylis, above n 11 , 211. 
137 Ibid, 203. 
138 Heleen Scheer "Publicity and the Presumption oflnnocence" (1993) 52 CLJ 37, 39. See also,
 ibid. 
139 Roderick Munday "Name Suppression: An Adjunct to the Presumption of Innocence and to M
itigation 
of Sentence (1991) Crim LR 680, 756: "[there are two reasons why the naming of a defendant
 is not crucial 
to the exercise of justice in the open] first , the stigma and intense anguish occasioned by the m
ere fact of a 
charge having been laid against a named party and, secondly, the residual stigma that adheres 
to that 
individual even after acquittal. This latter feeling, that there is no smoke without fire, cannot b
e 
discounted. The suspicion is conveniently fuelled by a system where convictions are only returne
d 
following the highest measure of proof . . and [it can] be compounded by media failure to report an
 acquittal 
as prominently as an initial charge" (emphasis added). 
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'technicality', as there 1s 'no smoke without fire"'. 
140 In light of this it has been said 
that: 141 
It is a little paradoxical that a system of trial designed to give the accused the 
be11efit of the doubt in court is almost bou11d to e11sure that the public does the 
opposite. 
The pnmary deduction that everyone draws from the presumption of innocence is 
obviously that at trial the defendant gets the benefit of the doubt. Yet there are, in 
relation to unconvicted and acquitted persons, other deductions that can be drawn from it. 
It seems that common lawyers, who are the first to say that the presumption of innocence 
is central to their system, seem to draw fewer deductions from it than are often drawn 
elsewhere. As Glanville Williams says of our treatment of unconvicted persons in the 
Proof of Guilt, 3rd ed. (London 1964) p. 184, "it is a repudiation of the philosophy behind 
the supposed presumption of innocence". 
Name publication of an accused - especially at the pre-trial stage - is arguably a 
serious encroachment on their right to be presumed innocent. 142 Blind application of a 
high threshold to displace the principle of open justice without consideration of the 
presumption would seemingly prevent an accused from having the opportunity to obtain 
the full benefit of their right to be presumed innocent.
143 To manifest the presumption 
with any real value, it must always form part of the assessment of a request for name 
suppression of an accused. 144 An accused should not suffer unjust punishment.
145 
14° Claire Baylis, above n 11, 203. See also, Heleen Scheer, above n 138, 39; and ibid, 757:"Damage, 
therefore may be inflicted by identifying a party whom the law presumes innocent, regardless that it is done 
in the name of some greater general good .. . The true object of the press rather too often is to pad out the 
local rag, or to indulge the appetites of readers avid for a scandalous or grotesque fait divers ... It is not an 
essential prerequisite of a criminal justice system that suspects be always identified publicly. Nor need 
anonymity herald the end of a civilized and publicly accountable justice system." 
141 Heleen Scheer, above n 138, 39, first citing Nigel Walker "Curiosities of Criminal Justice" (1975) 
XL VIII Police Journal 9 ( emphasis added). 
142 Fiona Jackson, above n 92, 35; and Claire Baylis, above n 11, 203. 
143 Indeed some have gone further: see, for example, Fiona Jackson, above n 92, 35: " ... there should be a 
requirement of"compelling reasons", such as genuine public interest reasons, in order to disallow an 
accused person ' s application for name suppression because of the importance of the presumption of 
innocence." 
144 Katrina Jones, above n 2 7, 18. 
145 See also, albeit in a slightly different context R v Si/a (6 May 2008) HC CHCH CRI 2007-009-006120, 
paras 19 and 27 Fogarty J: "Because of the presumption of innocence, l am of the view that as a matter of 
principle the publicity adverse to the accused should be limited, as a precaution, to avoid imposing an 
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While some assert open justice is more readily offset before (rather than after) 
conviction because the potential for hardship to be suffered at this stage is greater, 
146 this 
is because a person has the right to be presumed innocent during this stage. Simply put, 
the potential for hardship to be suffered is greater at this point because an accused may 
endure harm that is severe and disproportionate considering they may not be guilty of the 
offence. Where the damage will be significant and disproportionate, suppression to 
minimise the harm may outweigh the principle of open justice.
147 Nevertheless, whatever 
the exact justification, it is apparent the factors relevant at each stage of a case differ. 
E Does the Threshold Differ between the Different Stages of a Case? 
There has been some dissatisfaction over the high threshold required for name 
suppression at any stage of a case. In Lewis v Wilson and Horton Ltd ("Lewis"), the 
Court of Appeal reiterated that the balance must come down "clearly in favour of 
suppression" before the presumption in favour of open reporting is overcome.
148 While 
the High Court has found that a requirement for ' compelling reasons' to justify name 
suppression may set the test higher than that proposed by the Court of Appeal in Lewis,
149 
the Court of Appeal in Re Victim X went further and found that "compelling reasons" or 
"very special circumstances" were required to justify a departure from the presumption of 
· · 150 open Justice. 
unjust punishment. [ ... ] . .. I must ensure that I do not impose a punishment on an accused person prior to 
conviction". 
146 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 29 . 
147 T v Police, above n 11 2, para 24 Pankhurst J: "The principle of open justice is of lesser significance 
where an interim order is made in recognition of the fact that at least until guilt is determined there are 
legitimate private interests which warrant protection in the meantime". 
148 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd, above n 22, para 43 Elias CJ for the Court. 
149 Abbott v Wallace [2002] NZAR 95, para 34 (HC) Salmon and Potter JJ. 
150 Re Victim X, above n 44, para 37 (CA) Keith J for the Court. 
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Recently some decisions have suggested that the threshold differs between the 
stages of a case 15 1 because "the opposing values cannot be resolved at a general level" .152 
In Xv New Zealand Police, Baragwanath J held: 153 
The factors of importance are first the public interest in openness which is a pointer 
towards declining the application. But contrary to what was said by the learned Judge the 
test for exercise of the jurisdiction under section 140 is not whether "there are exceptional 
reasons." It is simply whether departure from that starting point is justified on an overall 
balancing of the relevant factors in accordance with the test of what at thi s stage the 
interests of justice require. 
This approach recogruses that open justice is the starting point but may not 
necessarily be the finishing point - an assessment must be made on the specific facts, and 
particular stage, of the case. 154 While the relevant factors at each stage will vary with 
every case, 155 considerations such as the presumption of innocence, privacy and personal 
dignity "are not pieties to be intoned and disregarded in suppression applications but 
factors which may warrant substantial weight when the ultimate evaluation is 
performed". 156 
Although this approach has been criticised as an "abandonment of a high 
threshold in favour of a vague ' overall balancing ' test" which could lead to more name 
suppression applications being granted, 157 it has been followed in subsequent cases. In 
both GAP v New Zealand Police and Nobilo v New Zealand Police the High Court 
similarly found that the presumption of open justice may more easily be displaced when 
151 Suppression and Contempt, above n 37, 15 . See, for example, X v New Zealand Police, above n 19; 
GAP v New Zealand Police, above n 76; J v Serious Fraud Office, above n 76; Nobilo v New Zealand 
Police, above n 76; and R v B, above n 32. 
152 R v B, above n 32, para 29 Baragwanath J. 
153 Xv New Zealand Police, above n 19, para 34 Baragwanath J. 
154 Ibid, para 8 Baragwanath J. 
155 See for example, ibid. para 16 Baragwanath J: "The importance of publicity in preserving the integrity 
of the evidentiary process, and the role of the media as surrogates for the public.. .are of particular 
application at the second stage." See also, ibid , paras 11-12, 15-19, 22, 29 , 35-38 Baragwanath J for other 
considerations that may be relevant at each stage, such as : the potential for severe hardship to be suffered, 
family and health considerations, open justice interests, privacy and the presumption of innocence. 
156 Ibid, para 29 Baragwanath J. 
157 Suppression and Contempt, above n 37, 16. 
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name suppression is sought pre-trial as opposed to after conviction and t
ests requiring 
'compelling reasons' or 'very special circumstances' to displace the presum
ption of open 
reporting are only appropriate during or post-trial. 
158 In R v B the Court of Appeal 
described what is required as "a careful appraisal of each of the competin
g values and 
their importance within the context of the particular facts and circums
tances of the 
case". 159 The presumption of innocence and adverse consequences of pu
blication are 
among the factors to be considered and the process itself is dynamic; "the 
position may 
h h . 1 
k I ,, 160 
c ange as t e pre-tna processes ta e p ace . 
F Critique 
1 A balancing exercise 
The principles espoused in Liddell are fundamental for all name suppr
ession 
applications. However the context of that decision must be remembered: 
161 
The judgment in Liddell was expressed in terms of general application, but 
the Court was 
dealing with a post-conviction suppression and not with particularity 
with the matters 
relevant to suppression of names in other cases. The emphasis given 
in Liddell to the 
presumption in favour of openness does not exonerate a Court from ma
king the difficult 
balancing of interests which may arise in a pre-conviction application. 
Whilst the New 
Zealand Bill of rights enshrines the basic value of freedom to rec
eive and impart 
information, it also enshrines the right, in relation to determination of
 a charge, to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law (s 25(d)) [si
c - s 25(c)]. In 
ancillary aspects of the criminal process each of these rights has to be tak
en in balance. 
In pre-conviction applications, the presumption of innocence is a relevant f
actor, 
and important individual right, that must not be overlooked. 
162 
158 Ibid. 
159 R v B, above n 32, para 29 Baragwanath J. 
160 Ibid, para 57 Baragwanath J. 
161 S(I) and S(2), above n 108, 718 Neazor J. 
162 Ibid; M v Police, above n l; R v B, above n 32; J v Serious Fraud Office, ab
ove n 76; and Prockter v R, 
above n 30. 
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It must always be remembered that the exercise of the discretion in section 140 is 
fundamentally a balancing exercise. Similarly it ought to be recognised that the principle 
of open justice is so essential to our justice system that publication should always be the 
norm and suppression must be the exception. However, placing too much emphasis on 
thresholds requiring "compelling reasons" or "very special circumstances" can distract 
from the need to undertake a considered balancing assessment of the particular 
circumstances in the case. Blind application of such standards should be avoided. While 
they may be appropriate in some, if not most, instances - for example in relation to an 
application for name suppression of a convicted defendant - such a standard may be 
inappropriate in other circumstances. An objective evaluation of the competing factors
163 
will lead the court to where the balance should fall, a process familiar from BORA 
· · d 164 Junspru ence: 
The Judge must identify and weigh the interests, public and private, which are relevant in 
the particular case. It will be necessary to confront the principle of open justice and on 
what basis it should yield. And since the Judge is required by s 3 to appl y the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, it will be necessary for the Judge to consider whether in 
the circumstances the order prohibiting publication under s 140 is a reasonable limitation 
upon the s 14 right to receive and impart information such as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society (the test provided by s 5). Given the congruence 
of these important considerations, the balance must come down clearly in favour of 
suppression if the prima facie presumption in favour of open reporting is to be overcome. 
Moreover, it must be recognised that any balancing exercise is inevitably dynamic 
- it will vary with the different considerations relevant at the particular stage of the case 
at which the application is made, and indeed even within each stage
165 of a case: 166 
163 R v B, above n 32, para 3 Baragwanath J. 
164 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd, above n 22, para 43 Elias CJ for the Court. Though the author notes that 
this statement does not identify the other side to be balanced - for example, the presumption innocence and 
overriding requirement that the trial be fair: see, for example, R v B, above n 32, para 3 Baragwanath J. See 
also, on a separate but related point, Jessica Meech, above n 23 , 30 and Media Law Journal 
www.medialawjoumal.co.nz (last accessed 23 September 2009) where it is suggested that too often a Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 analysis is missing fromjudgments. 
165 R v B, above n 32, para 57 Baragwanath J: " It is to be borne in mind that the process is dynamic; the 
position may change as the pre-trial processes take place." 
166 Ibid, para 60 Baragwanath J . See also, Simon Mount, above n 2, 437 : " . . . the presumption of innocence 
may carry different weights at different stages in the criminal process .. . " 
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(b) the principles that apply to the initial stages of a case, where the accused has no 
opportunity to offer a defence, may well assume a very different shape when the defence 
is able to present its side. The reason for the distinction among the three stages of a case -
pre-trial, trial and post-trial - is that what may be unfair publicity at the first stage may be 
necessary at the second to permit proper reporting of the trial and be fully justified by the 
verdict that marks the third stage; 
The exercise of the discretion under section 140 is simply an objective assessment 
of whether departure from the starting point of open justice is justified on an overall 
balancing of the relevant factors in accordance with the test of what, at the particular 
stage of the case, the interests of justice require. 
167 While at some stages it may require 
"compelling reasons" or "very special circumstances", this may not be necessary at other 
points. 
2 A note on names 
It is important to note the actual effect of name suppression on open justice: 
168 
[N]ame suppression is not the same as holding the proceedings in camera.
169 It is still 
possible to go and watch the proceedings, and it is also still possible to publish 
information about them. The only limitation is that the press cannot print the name of the 
accused. But surely a report can still be "fair and accurate" without the name of the 
accused but with, for example, initials, and enables the public to provide "a safeguard 
against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy". 
Name suppression does not preclude the media from reporting on a case nor 
prevent the public from attending the proceedings; it only restricts the media from 
167 Xv New Zealand Police, above n 19, para 34 Baragwanath J. 
168 Heleen Scheer, above n 138, 38 (emphasis in the original). Naturally this statement would appl
y with 
equal force to not only name suppression of an accused, but of any other person "connected with 
proceedings" under section 140. 
169 Where the court considers it desirable, in the interests of justice or in order to prevent undue ha
rdship to 
any person, to order certain persons or all persons except those specified to remove themselves 
from the 
court room during proceedings. For a discussion of some of the principles of in camera procee
dings see 
Para ha and ors v New Zealand Police, above n 60, para 25 Heath J. 
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publishing the name of the suppressed party. Name publicity can significantly impact an 
individual and those connected with them. So much so that many, while acknowledging 
the two aspects of open justice, question whether the principle justifies wide (and 
sometimes intense) media publicity of all names - especially perhaps, for an accused. 
It is often said the public interest provides this justification. While this may be 
correct, a distinction ought to be drawn between "cases of mere curiosity and cases where 
the press seeks to publish information or comment about a matter of genuine public 
interest."170 In the case of an accused, there may be some instances where there is "no 
relevant public interest or need to know that this [person] has been charged". 171 Name 
suppression is only granted where an individual can demonstrate that their circumstances 
are sufficient to overcome the presumption of open justice. While the public have a right 
to receive information of any kind, 172 where their interest may only be mere curiosity and 
there are other significant factors pointing towards suppression, name suppression may be 
a justified limitation on freedom of expression and open justice. Indeed, some have put it 
more candidly: 173 
[T]he integrity of the justice system and the right to freedom of expression do not require 
the reporting of the full personal details of parties involved in Court proceedings (this 
includes the names of the accused in criminal trials) since the well being of the parties and 
their families is of paramount importance. 
Moreover, justice can be done without names. Although some may assert the 
benefit of open justice is reciprocal - in that both the public and defendant have an 
interest in ensuring proceedings are open and fair - name suppression does not preclude 
the fair and proper administration of justice. The court is still open; 174 reporting is only 
narrowly restricted. Furthermore, name suppression may not be permanent - therefore 
170 Newspaper Publishers Association of New Zealand (Inc) v Family Court [1999] 2 NZLR 344, 352 (HC) 
Pankhurst and Chisholm JJ. 
17 1 R v H [1996] 2 NZLR 487,489 (HC) Baragwanath J . See also, Katrina Jones, above n 27, 19: 
"Society·s curiosity with names should not outweigh the individual right to the presumption of innocence." 
172 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14 ( emphasis added). 
173 Butler and Butler, above n 57,338. See also John Burrows "Media Law" (2004) NZLRev 787, 797. 
174 Xv New Zealand Police, above n 19, para 17 Baragwanath J: "Suppression applications by contrast [to 
bail hearings] are dealt with in open court and the interest of open justice is correspondingly enhanced." 
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granting name suppression for an accused pre-trial, for example, may only postpone 
publication and the interests of open justice can still be met.
175 The process is dynamic; 
as the case proceeds to the next stage name suppression may no longer be justified. 
The nature of the public interest and value in publication of a name must be 
considered in the discretionary exercise of section 140. Indeed, this consideration may be 
particularly pertinent for name suppression of parties other than defendants who are 
' connected with proceedings' .
176 
G Possible Approaches 
Whatever the correct evaluation of the authorities, there appears to be some 
inconsistency and divergence in approach to section 140. There are a number of possible 
approaches that could be adopted. 
1 Law Commission 
In 2008 the Law Commission suggested a different approach from its earlier 
recommendations. 177 
The Commission suggested three grounds that should operate to rebut the 
presumption of open justice in name suppression applications: "the risk of prejudice to a 
fair trial; undue hardship to the victim; and the overall interests of justice". 
178 The 
Commission left open whether the final ground, the overall interests of justice, should be 
explicated by an exhaustive or non-exhaustive list of factors.
179 
The Commission also expressed a tentative view that the particular considerations 
relevant at the pre-trial stage did not require a different approach to name suppression to 
175 R v B, above n 32, para 2 Baragwanath J. 
176 See Parts VIC 2 (c) Public interest and justice without a name; and VD 2 Policy. 
177 See Part IV C 2 The different stages of a case. 
178 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 19. 
179 Ibid, 20 
43 
be used during this period. 180 The author notes that this conclusion may have been 
influenced by the position taken by the Commission as to the relevance of the 
· f · 181 presumption o mnocence. 
2 South Australia 
A unique approach has been taken in South Australia. 182 Section 69A of the 
Evidence Act 1929 (SA) provides two grounds under which a suppression order may be 
made. 183 The provision is detailed and provides some guidance to assist in the exercise of 
the discretion. 184 
Additionally, media that report criminal proceedings against an identified person 
before the result is known must publish a fair and accurate report of the result of the 
proceedings if the accused is ultimately acquitted. 185 Moreover, this subsequent report 
must be of similar prominence to the earlier report and published as soon as practicable 
after the determination of the proceedings. There are penalties for not following these 
· 186 requrrements. 
3 Evaluation and suggested provisions 
The author agrees with the Commission that there is considerable merit in setting 
out the grounds for name suppression in legislation. The grounds proposed by the 
Commission are adequate and the author is of the opinion that the ' overall interests of 
justice' ground should not be defined given the considerable diversity of factors this 
180 Ibid, 30. 
18 1 See Part IV D 2 Law Commission and the difficulty with the presumption of innocence. 
182 Evidence Act 1929 (SA). See Part X C Appendix Evidence Act 1929 (SA), ss 69A, 70, 71B. 
183 Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 69A(l) . These grounds are: to prevent prejudice to the proper administration 
of justice; and to prevent undue hardship to an alleged victim, witness or potential witness, or a child. They 
are similar to the grounds suggested by the Law Commission in 2008: see Part IVG 1 Law Commission. 
184 Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 69(2). 
185 Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 7IB(l). 
186 Ibid. 
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category may envelope
187 
- a level of discretion must remain in order to address different 
cases that may come before the court. While the author agrees with the tentative op
inion 
of the Commission insofar as it views a separate and different approach to 
name 
suppression during the pre-trial stage unnecessary, the author does believe tha
t any 
approach to name suppression for defendants in criminal proceedings must take
 into 
account the stage of the case at which the application is made. The author acknowle
dges 
that while this may mean the approach is no different, the practical exercise o
f the 
discretion may differ. The author believes the failure of the Commission to acknow
ledge 
the relevance of the stage of a case as a necessary factor and its omission to pr
ovide 
further guidance to assist the court in the exercise of its discretion are shortcomings o
f the 
proposal. 
The South Australian approach, with its additional reporting requirements on 
publishers, more adequately recognises the potential for publicity to cause signif
icant 
harm to a defendant - especially one later acquitted. It seemingly seeks to ensure that al
l 
judicial proceedings are publicly reported, even when some individuals may not de
serve 
the punishment that may cause, but seeks to alleviate this potential harm by ensurin
g the 
results of proceedings are equivalently published. Moreover, it provides clear gro
unds 
for when name suppression may be granted and a useful level of guidance to assis
t the 
court in its discretion. However it makes no explicit mention of the relevance o
f the 
stage of the proceedings and the presumption of innocence and may therefore fa
il to 
recognise that publicity, even if later acquittal is reported, may unjustly punis
h an 
accused. 1
88 Furthermore, it may be administratively cumbersome for the court to patrol 
the reporting of all proceedings by all media organisations to ensure that they publis
h "as 
soon as practicable after the determination of the proceedings" a "fair and accurate r
eport 
of the result of the proceedings with reasonable prominence having regard to
 the 
prominence of the earlier report" .
189 
187 See, for example, Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 20 where the Law Com
mission 
discusses some of these factors. 
188 See Part IV D 3 Relevance of the presumption of innocence. 
189 Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 71B(l). A balanced job, in fairness, a responsible (and et
hical) media 
organisation should be doing properly already. Though outside the scope of this pap
er, the author notes -
45 
While both approaches have their advantages, a better approach may go further to 
acknowledge that it is imperative to consider the stage of the case at which the 
application is made and provide more guidance to assist the court in the exercise of its 
discretion. The process is dynamic, suppression at one stage, and its temporary 
infringement on freedom of expression and open justice, may be inappropriate at 
another. 190 Although the author sees significant merit - particularly in terms of certainty 
- in the 2004 Law Commission recommendation, 191 the author prefers the presumption of 
open justice to not be reversed at all stages and favours an approach which considers 
"whether departure from that starting point is justified on an overall balancing of the 
relevant factors in accordance with the test of what at this stage the interests of justice 
• ,, 192 reqmre . 
The author suggests the following provisions are more suitable: 
Section 140A Publication of the identifying particulars of a person charged with an 
offence before first court appearance prohibited 
Except as otherwise expressly provided in any enactment, publication of the name, 
address, occupation or any identifying particulars of a person charged with an offence 
before they appear in court is prohibited unless that person consents to publication. 
Section 140B Court may prohibit publication of identifying particulars of defendant 
(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in any enactment, a court may make an order 
prohibiting the publication, in any report or account relating to any proceedings in 
respect of any offence, of the name, address or occupation of any defendant, or any 
particulars likely to lead to any such person 's identification, if that court is satisfied 
that publication would -
(a) for any reason not be in the interests of justice; 
(b) cause undue hardship to the complainant or victim; or 
(c) cause a risk of prejudice to a fair and impartial trial. 
(2) In considering whether to make such an order, the court must recognise -
(a) that a primary objective in the administration of justice is to safeguard the public 
interest in open justice and the consequential right of the news media to publish 
information relating to court proceedings; and 
with interest - that it is unclear how the provision would address publishers outside the State of South 
Australia, both within other States in Australia and internationally. 
190 See also, Re Victim X, above n 44, para 8 (HC) Hammond J: " it must be ... that a suppression order, even 
if validly granted at a particular time, should continue for no longer, and be cast no more widely, than is 
appropriate. The Court must itself therefore have an overarching responsibility in this respect to see that 
suppression orders, by the time a trial is reached, are not inappropriately maintained in place." 
191 See Part IV C 2 (c) (i) Suppression until the substance of the case has been 'gone into '. 
192 Xv New Zealand Police, above n 19, para 34 Baragwanath J. See Part IV E Does the Threshold Differ 
between the Different Stages of a Case? for further description of the factors relevant at each stage. 
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(b) the stage of the proceedings at which the application is made. 
(3) In considering whether to make such an order, the court shall consider -
(a) whether there is a real and substantial risk that the defendant would suffe
r 
significant and disproportionate harm if their identity was disclosed; 
(b) whether effective alternatives are available to protect the identity of th
e 
defendant; 
( c) the impact of the proposed order on the freedom of expression of those affected
 
by it; 
(d) in pre-conviction (or acquittal) applications, the right of the defendant to b
e 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law; 
(e) whether the public interest requires that the identifying particulars of th
e 
defendant not be suppressed; 
(t) the salutary and deleterious effects of the proposed order; and 
(g) any other factor that the judge or justice considers relevant at this stage of th
e 
proceedings. 
(4) The court may only make a suppression order if it is satisfied that in
 the 
circumstances there is a sufficient threat to the interests of justice, to a risk o
f 
prejudice to a fair and impartial trial, or to the undue hardship to the complainant o
r 
victim, to justify the making of the order in the particular case. 
H Conclusion 
Section 140 confers a broad discretion to grant a defendant name suppression. 
The lack of direction from the legislature is unhelpful; it is a difficult enough bala
nce to 
strike. There is a notable amount of inconsistency and divergence in approach 
to the 
discretion. Moreover, a number of difficult issues - particularly the relevance 
of the 
presumption of innocence and stage of proceedings to the assessment - need 
to be 
clarified. There is a real need for the legislature to provide more guidance 
in the 
provision to assist the court in the exercise of its discretion. 
V THIRD PARTIES - EXACTLY WHO IS "CONNECTED WITH T
HE 
PROCEEDINGS"? 
Section 140 allows the court to make an order prohibiting publication of 
identifying particulars of "any other person connected with the proceedings". 
This portion of the paper addresses the application of section 140 to individuals 
other than a defendant, who are connected to (and/or directly affected by
) the 
47 
proceedings. The first part of this portion of the paper examines the extent to which third 
parties come within the phrase "connected with the proceedings". The second part of this 
portion of the paper addresses the application of this section to victims and witnesses who 
are "connected with the proceedings".193 
A Introduction 
The ability of the court to suppress identifying particulars of affected third parties 
ought to be reconsidered. While frequently the phrase "connected with the proceedings" 
has been taken to encompass persons connected to proceedings only by virtue of their 
relationship to a defendant, it has most recently been interpreted to exclude these 
individuals and be limited to only those actually connected to the proceedings. These 
two different interpretations have arisen from case law. 194 
B Wide Inte,pretation 
In Liddell the Court of Appeal held that the wife and sons of an accused who had 
been convicted of sexual offences were persons "connected with the proceedings" and 
that there was no reason why they "should not receive such protection as the statute 
enables" .195 The Court made what it called a "much more limited order" and prohibited 
the publication of their names and identifying particulars, even though the name of the 
accused was not suppressed.196 
In A Def endant v Police ("A Defendan f') the Court refused to grant name 
suppression to a District Court Judge charged with numerous sexual offences. 197 
However, the Court made an order prohibiting publication of the identifying particulars 
193 See Part VI Victims and Witnesses - Are we being Unfair? 
194 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 38. 
195 R v Liddell, above n 24, 546 Cooke P for the Court ( emphasis added). 
196 Ibid. 
197 "A Def endant " v Police, above n 109, 589 Doogue J. 
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of his wife and children under section 140 and, to support this order, prohibited 
publication of the address of the accused.
198 
While this wide interpretation encompassmg persons "connected with the 
proceedings" only by virtue of their relationship to a defendant has been applied in cases 
both before 199 and since Liddel!,
200 a recent decision has rejected this interpretation in 
favour of a narrower version.
201 
C Narrow Interpretation 
In R v Shapiro ("Shapiro"), Mr Shapiro abandoned pursuit for name suppression 
of his own name in favour of a suppression order in relation to the identity of his 
employer. 202 Mr Shapiro was a professional musician employed by the Christchurch 
Symphony Orchestra ("CSO"). In 2007 he was charged with unlawful possession of 
explosives, weapons and ammunition. 
203 Both Mr Shapiro and his employer swore 
affidavits in support of the application indicating that "the orchestra relies heavily upon 
sponsorship ... for its survival", that publicity surrounding the case was placing "real 
strains" on that relationship, and that a number of these supporters had already expressed 
their concern about the association.
204 
The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Shapiro' s appeal for its failure to surmount 
what it called a 'jurisdictional barrier' .
205 The Court did not entertain argument outside 
this matter including a submission by Mr Shapiro questioning whether the general public 
had a legitimate interest in knowing the name of an entity employing a person facing 
198 Ibid. 
199 See, for example, T v Commissioner of Police (21 November 1991) HC AK AP 282/91 where Tom
pkins 
J suppressed the name of the employer of a man charged with aggravated robbery because the int
erests of 
those directly involved with the employer could be adversely affected. The jurisdictional basis fo
r the 
order was not discussed. 
200 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 38. 
201 R v Shapiro [2008] NZCA 151 (CA). 
202 Ibid, para 3 Harrison J for the Court. 
203 Ibid, paras 5-6 Harrison J for the Court. These were offences under the Arms Act 1983. 
204 Ibid, paras 8-9 Harrison J for the Court. 
205 Ibid, para 14 Harrison J for the Court . 
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criminal charges.206 The Court found that the CSO, as Mr Shapiro's employer, was "not 
'connected with' the criminal proceedings against Mr Shapiro by virtue solely of its 
status as his employer":207 
That is not a relationship of connection with the proceedings sufficient to fall within the 
purview of a discretionary power that has the effect of imposing a limitation on the 
entrenched right of freedom of speech: s 14 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
The Court found that the Full Court of the Court of Appeal in Liddell had 
extended the ambit of the protection under section 140 without "subjecting the statutory 
provision to analysis or identifying the jurisprudential basis" for its conclusion that the 
necessary connection was present in that case. 208 The Court sought to distinguish Liddell 
as being "not of direct assistance here" and suggested that the Full Court had viewed the 
circumstances in that case as "exceptional".209 The Court then held:210 
We do not accept that a Court's jurisdiction under s 140 ... extends to prohibition of 
publication of the name of an entity which is not connected with the proceedings but only 
with the accused. That information is of a collateral nature and is unrelated to the 
criminal proceedings. 
In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal has effectively narrowed the 
availability of name suppression under section 140 to only persons strictly connected 
with the proceedings - third parties, such as family members of a defendant, are no 
longer able to obtain protection under section 140.
211 
206 Ibid, para 13 Harrison J for the Court. 
207 Ibid, para 15 Harrison J for the Court, after having held that the Christchurch Symphony Orchestra - as 
an incorporated body - was a "person": Interpretation Act 1999, s 30. 
208 Ibid, para 16 Harrison J for the Court. 
209 Ibid, para 17 Harrison J for the Court. 
210 Ibid, para 19 Harrison J for the Court. 
211 Interestingly the Court left open the question of whether such an order might be possible under the 
inherent jurisdiction of the court: ibid, para 21 Harrison J for the Court. See also Part III C A Door Left 
Ajar? The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court. 
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D Analysis and Call for Reconsideration 
There is now no law that allows third parties such as family members to 
protection in their own right if their only connection to proceedings is a connection to the 
accused.212 There a number of difficulties with this. 
1 Shapiro 
A couple of observations can be made about the analysis in Shapiro. 
Firstly, the Court of Appeal held that the relationship in Shapiro did not have a 
sufficient enough connection to be within the ambit of a discretionary power "that has the 
effect of imposing a limitation on the entrenched right of freedom of speech: s 14 New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990".2 13 This statement overstates the status of the BORA 
and freedom of expression in New Zealand and may have potentially coloured the rest of 
the analysis of the Court. Neither the BORA nor section 14 is entrenched or conferred 
the status of supreme law. Moreover, all rights affirmed by the BORA - including 
freedom of expression - are subject to "such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".
214 Consequently the finding 
that the phrase cannot include people connected with proceedings only by virtue of their 
relationship with a defendant because this is not a sufficient enough connection in order 
to limit the freedom of expression may be mistaken - especially without undertaking a 
full BORA analysis.215 Arguably it would be a justified limitation on the freedom of 
expression to suppress the names of parties connected to proceedings in this way should 
the harm they may suffer be disproportionately severe, indeed this has been the case in 
other decisions already.216 Furthermore, the availability of such an order to protect a 
third party from severe hardship rather than protecting these parties through an order 
212 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 38. 
213 R v Shapiro , above n 201, para 15 Harrison J for the Court (emphasis added). 
214 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
215 Such an analysis can be seen R v Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC). 
2 16 R v Liddell, above n 24; and "A Defendant" v Police, above n 109. 
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suppressmg the name of a defendant, would seemingly allow for the least possible 
infringement on the freedom of expression and open justice. 
Secondly, the major criticism from the Court of Appeal of the cases that had 
favoured a wide interpretation of the phrase was that these decisions had not subjected 
this phrase to analysis or identified the jurisprudential basis for that interpretation. 217 
However in making this finding, the Court of Appeal itself conducted only a limited 
statutory analysis of the phrase to establish its jurisdictional basis. While the Court could 
have thoroughly investigated the etymology of the phrase to help establish its meaning, it 
preferred to focus its analysis only on an impression that open justice and the freedom of 
expression required a more sufficient connection to the proceedings in order to be 
lirnited.218 Moreover, the Court of Appeal did not discuss what is included within the 
ambit of the phrase - for example, victirns219 and witnesses. 220 Even though the fact that 
a number of decisions - including a Full Court of the Court of Appeal - had interpreted 
section 140 to include people connected to proceedings by virtue of their close 
relationship to a defendant would seemingly be relevant to any discussion of the meaning 
of the phrase, these cases were distinguished as being of "[no] direct assistance".221 
2 Policy 
While there may be some issues with the analysis in Shapiro - and whatever the 
correct interpretation of the phrase is in section 140 - it would seem there are a number 
of policy arguments that would justify reconsideration of this issue. 
Firstly, while all third parties connected to criminal proceedings may always be 
adversely affected, there will be some instances where publication of their identifying 
217 See, for example, R v Shapiro, above n 201, paras 16 and 18 Harrison J for the Court. But compare, R v 
Liddell, above n 24, 546 Cooke P for the Court: "We see no reason, however, why these innocent persons 
[the accused 's wife and sons], although they are "connected with the proceedings" as the Judge held, should 
not receive such protection as the statute enables." Arguably Liddell did think such jurisdiction existed. 
218 R v Shapiro , above n 201, para 15 Harrison J for the Court. 
219 See, for example, Re Victim X, above n 44. 
220 See, for example, Taylor v Attorney-General, above n 54; and R v Burns (Travis), above n 26. 
221 R v Shapiro , above n 201, para 17 Harrison J for the Court. 
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particulars will cause them to be disproportionately affected. Arguably in these situations 
some protection ought to be available. Indeed the Law Commission has rightly 
highlighted that:222 
It seems anomalous that hardship to family members is an accepted factor in the context 
of a decision to suppress the name of an offender, but in the absence of an order relating 
to the offender, those same members cannot be protected from publicity, no matter how 
extreme the degree of hardship suffered. 
Secondly, the Court of Appeal in Shapiro found that identifying particulars of 
third parties, such as Mr Shapiro's employer, connected to a defendant facing criminal 
proceedings is information "of a collateral nature and is unrelated to the criminal 
proceedings". 223 If this is indeed the case, it is hard to identify whether there is genuine 
public interest in knowing the identifying details of these people. What does publication 
of this information add to the public interest, beyond mere public curiosity, in the 
criminal proceedings? While the public has freedom to seek and receive information "of 
any kind in any form", 224 perhaps where their only interest in this 'unrelated' information 
is mere curiosity and the potential degree of hardship that may be suffered by these 
parties is significant and disproportionate, the suppression of such information would be 
a justified limitation on the freedom of expression.
225 This provides further support for 
the availability of such an order. 
Finally, the ability of the court to make an order, where appropriate, prohibiting 
publication of identifying details of a third party may assist and promote open justice and 
freedom of expression overall. This is because the availability of such a limited order, 
rather than one suppressing the identifying particulars of a defendant, can be the least 
possible infringement on open justice and freedom of expression. This is because 
arguably publication of identifying particulars of a defendant is principally the 
information that is more directly relevant to the criminal proceedings and the availability 
221 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 38 . 
223 R v Shapiro, above n 201 , para 19 Harrison J for the Court ( emphasis added). 
224 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14 (emphasis added). 
m Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
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of which is in the public interest. For example, the orders made in Liddell and A 
Defendant illustrate that a limited order can be made protecting the family of a defendant 
from severe hardship by suppressing their identifying details, thus abrogating the need to 
suppress the identifying particulars of the defendant in order to protect those parties, and 
thereby ensuring that details of the defendant are still published and open justice and 
freedom of expression are the least infringed. 
3 Evaluation and suggested provision 
If the judiciary does not reconsider the meaning of the phrase, Parliament could 
define "connected with proceedings" m the CJA, for example, to include persons 
connected to proceedings by virtue of a relationship of sufficient connection or 
alternatively a separate provision could be enacted - the following is suggested: 
Section 140C Court may prohibit publication of identifying particulars of third 
parties 
(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in any enactment, a court may make an order 
prohibiting the publication, in any report or account relating to any proceedings in 
respect of any offence, of the name, address or occupation of any third party 
connected with the proceedings, directly or by virtue of a relationship of sufficient 
connection with a party to the proceedings, or any particulars likely to lead to any 
such person's identification, if that court is satisfied that publication would -
(a) for any reason not be in the interests of justice; 
(b) endanger the safety of any person; or 
(c) cause undue hardship to the third party. 
(2) In considering whether to make such an order, the court must recognise -
(a) that a primary objective in the administration of justice is to safeguard the public 
interest in open justice, the right to a fair and public hearing, and the 
consequential right of the news media to publish information relating to court 
proceedings; and 
(b) the stage of the proceedings at which the application is made. 
(3) In considering whether to make such an order, the court shall consider -
(a) whether there is a real and substantial risk that the third party would suffer 
significant and disproportionate hann if their identity were disclosed; 
(b) whether effective alternatives are available to protect the identity of the third 
party; 
( c) the impact of the proposed order on the freedom of expression of those affected 
by it; 
(d) whether the public interest requires that the identifying particulars of the third 
party not be suppressed; 
(e) the salutary and deleterious effects of the proposed order; and 
(f) any other factor that the judge or justice considers relevant at this stage of the 
proceedings. 
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(4) The court may only make a suppression order if it is satisfied that in the 
circumstances there is a sufficient threat to the interests of justice, the safety of any 
person, or to the undue hardship to the third party, to justify the making of the order 
in the particular case. 
E Conclusion 
Whether the interpretation favoured in Shapiro is correct or not, it would seem 
there are many policy considerations that would suggest (and justify) that the court 
should have the ability to prohibit, where appropriate, publication of identifying 
particulars of third parties connected to proceedings by virtue of a relationship of 
sufficient connection with a party to the proceedings.
226 
VI VICTIMS AND WITNESSES -ARE WE BEING UNFAIR? 
A Introduction 
These provisions are a direct legislative recognition by our Parliament of the difficult, 
more usually appalling, position in which victims are routinely placed as a result of 
criminal acts.227 
We cannot fail to have some sense of the anguish which this result, like similar decisions, 
causes for Mr X and his family. Our reading of all the material before the Court makes 
that worry very clear.228 
Victims and witnesses come into contact with the criminal justice system for very 
different reasons to a defendant. Victims
229 emerge because they have been victimised 
226 While it is outside the scope of this paper, should neither Parliament nor the judiciary reconsider this 
issue, the author suggests that such an order might be possible under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. 
The Court left open this question: R v Shapiro , above n 201 , para 21 Harrison J for the Court. See also, 
Part ill CA Door Left Ajar? The Inherent Juriscliction of the Court. 
m Re Victim X, above n 44, para 14 (HC) Hammond J. Hammond J discusses the provisions of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985, particularly section 139, and the Victims of Offences Act 1987 (now Victims 
Rights Act 2002). 
228 Ibid, para 58 (CA) Keith J for the Court . 
229 The author notes that it may be more accurate to describe this party as a complainant, at least in the 
initial stages of a case. Labelling this party as a victim at all stages presupposes they are a victim before a 
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by a defendant. Witnesses appear sometimes at will, sometimes not, 230 to assist the 
presentation of a case against a defendant to the court. Both are placed in these positions 
only in response to the actions of a defendant. This alone can be harrowing enough 
without the potential for these individuals to be subjected to intense media scrutiny. 
Victims may feel revictimised and witnesses may feel unfairly treated. Future victims 
and witnesses may be deterred or become reluctant to assist. In this context it seems 
unfair that the approach to name suppression for these individuals is the same as the 
approach to name suppression for defendants, whether accused or convicted. It is time 
the position of victims and witnesses is reconsidered. 
B Current Framework 
A number of statutory provisions restrict publication of the names of victims and 
witnesses in criminal proceedings. 
In the CJA, name suppression may be available automatically or at the discretion 
of the court. 231 There are also other specific statutory provisions. 232 In relation to 
witnesses generally, the Evidence Act 2006 provides pre-trial and trial anonymity orders 
b d · · · 233 may e ma e m certam mstances. 
C Assessing the Current Approach 
The Court of Appeal has held that the threshold for victim and witness name 
suppression under section 140 is no different to the approach to defendants. The starting 
defendant has been convicted. However, in the interests of brevity, the author uses the term 'victim ' 
throughout this portion of the paper to encompass both actual victims and complainants (unless the context 
makes otherwise clear) . See also Part IV E Victim or Complainant? 
23° For example a witness may be subpoenaed in criminal proceedings : see Crimes Act 1961 , s 351 and 
Summary Proceedings Act 1957, ss 20 and 38 . 
231 See Part III Current Legal Framework. 
232 See, for example, Evidence Act 2006, ss 108 and 109 which operate to protect the identity of witnesses 
who are undercover police officers. See also New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969, s 13A 
which operates to protect members of the Security Intelligence Service. 
133 Evidence Act 2006, ss 110 and 112. 
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point is the principle of open justice.
234 This presumption must be clearly outweighed
235 
by "compelling reasons" or "very special circumstances" to justify departure from open 
· · 236 Justice. 
1 Th e authority 
Re Victim X sets the threshold for victim and witness name suppression. 
X was a victim of an intended kidnapping plot. Three men were arrested on 
charges of attempted kidnapping. At the time of the attempted kidnapping, X was aged 
45 and living in Wellington as the executive chairman of a major New Zealand 
investment bank. He was married with three children, all from previous relationships. 
The two eldest (aged 15 and 17) lived in Auckland with their mother and a seven-year-
old daughter lived in Wellington in an equal shared custody arrangement between X and 
her mother. X' s current wife was also in an advanced pregnancy. 
(a) Re X 
In Re X , Hammond J dealt with an application to set aside an earlier order he had 
granted under urgent application suppressing the name of X.
237 He aclmowledged that 
" .. . the possibility of harm to a victim is explicitly recognised by our law, and must 
receive distinct consideration as to whether it displaces the general principle of open 
justice .. . "238 In addressing this, Hammond J identified the right of X (and his family) as 
victims to privacy and noted neither X nor his family had at any time courted publicity.
239 
Hammond J held that the stress publication would cause X and his family was significant 
234 R v Liddell, above n 24, 546-7 Cooke P for the Court. 
235 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd, above n 22, para 43 Elias CJ for the Court. 
236 Re Victim X, above n 44, para 37 (CA) Keith J for the Court. 
237 Re X [2002] NZAR 938 (HC). 
238 Ibid, para 13 Hammond J. 
239 Ibid, para 15 Hammond J. 
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and placed particular importance on potentially for adverse health affects to be suffered 
by X's pregnant wife.240 At this stage it was unlikely X would have to give evidence.241 
Hammond J held these factors dictated that it was an "unremarkable case for 
suppression" but for the one feature that the information had already been published on a 
United Kingdom website.242 Notwithstanding this, which Hammond J felt should not 
deflect the ability of the court to "afford such protection from harm to the victim as it can 
employ", he refused to set aside his earlier order and name suppression was 
maintained: 243 
[T]he general public interest in open justice is well out-weighed in this case by the harm 
- both actual and potential - which would be suffered by X and his family by 
publication of his name and particulars; and the resultant intrusion upon his and their 
privacy. And in the events which have happened, that harm would not diminish but 
enlarge on publication due to the likely increased media attention . 
(b) Re Victim X 
In Re Victim X Hammond J reviewed the suppression order on his own motion 
because circumstances had changed.244 This included that X' s wife had safely given birth 
and the enactment of the Victims' Rights Act 2002 ("VRA"). 245 However, particular 
emphasis was placed on the fact that X would now be giving evidence.246 
In light of these changes, the suppression order was lifted. The decision was 
appealed unsuccessfully.247 
240 Re Victim X, above n 44, para 11 (HC) Hammond J. 
241 Ibid, para 5 (HC) Hammond J. 
242 Re X, above n 237, para 20 Hammond J. 
243 Ibid, para 19 Hammond J ( emphasis added) . 
244 Re Victim X, above n 44, para 8 (HC) Hammond J. 
245 Ibid, para 8 (CA) Keith J for the Court. 
246 Ibid, para 8 (HC) Hammond J. 
247 Ibid, para 55 (HC) Hammond J: where Hammond J left open the question as to whether a party could 
appeal his order made in the course of the trial. See also ibid, paras 13 , 30 and 58 (CA) Keith J for the 
Court. An appeal was made but dismissed for want of jurisdiction . However, in its analysis the Court of 
Appeal affirmed Hammond J's approach. The author notes that strictly this affirmation is obiter only. 
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2 Difficulties with Re Victim X 
(a) Changed circumstances 
Hammond J found that Re X was an "unremarkable case for suppression". 
However, in Re Victim X Hammond J lifted the suppression order because circumstances 
had changed. The two changes principally relied upon were the successful child birth 
and that X would now be a witness in the trial. While these are significant changes, it is 
unclear whether they are of a sufficient magnitude to overturn Hammond J's original 
view that open justice was "well out-weighed" by the actual and potential harm which 
would be suffered by X and his family. This question cannot be answered 
determinatively as Hammond J did not discuss in-depth whether the other factors he 
found in Re X, which contributed to open justice being "well out-weighed", were still 
operating. 
Furthermore, the most emphasised change was that X would now be a witness.248 
Hammond J held, in the context of this development, that the approach to name 
suppression for victims is the same as the approach to name suppression for defendants. 
This means that the precedent for the approach to victim name suppression was coloured 
by the fact that the victim was also a witness. It is unclear what Hammond J's approach 
would have been if circumstances had changed but X had not become a witness, or in 
h d 'f X . . nl 249 ot er wor s, 1 was a v1ct1ID o y. 
248 The author notes that interestingly it seems that X only ended up in the witness box for a very short 
period of time to assist with a couple of minor points. He also had to face cross examination by one of his 
alleged kidnappers who represented himself. See Naming Mr X creates stir www.tvnz.co.nz (last accessed 
10 August 2009); and Alleged kidnap plot baffles Trotter www.tvnz.co .nz (last accessed 10 August 2009). 
249 See Part VIE Victim or Complainant? The author notes that this finding may mean a witness has 
comparatively less cause than a victim to justify name suppression. 
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(b) VRA treatment 
Re Victim X held that the VRA had not affected the approach to name suppression 
for victims.250 
The purpose of the VRA is to "improve provisions for the treatment and rights of 
victims of offences".251 The Act makes it clear that the judiciary should treat victims 
with courtesy, compassion and respect for their personal dignity and privacy. 252 However 
this does not confer any enforceable legal right. 253 In R v Kaloi Judge Roderick Joyce 
QC held that the VRA:254 
neither expresses nor implies any intent on the part of Parliament to displace the principle 
of open justice - a conclusion supported by the fact that Parliament did address the matter 
of suppression of certain victims in some ways but, as the Court of Appeal noted [in Re 
Victim X] , in the direction as it happens of openness if they consent. 
While this may be the correct interpretation of the influence of the VRA on the 
paramountcy of open justice in name suppression, it does not deflect from the fact that 
Parliament introduced the VRA to indicate that victims are different and require special 
attention. This would seemingly suggest that victims should be treated differently to 
defendants and an approach favoured that improves the treatment and rights of victims, 
showing courtesy, compassion and respect for their personal dignity and privacy. 
Arguably Re Victim X did not consider this point in depth. 
~
50 Re Victim X, above n 44, para 33 (HC) Hammond J and para 53 (CA) Keith J for the Court . 
~
51 Victims ' Rights Act 2002, s 3. 
252 Victims' Rights Act 2002, s 7. See also, Television New Zealand Ltd v R [1996] 3 NZLR 393 , 395 (CA) 
Keith J for the Court, 
253 Victims' Rights Act 2002, s 10. 
"
54 R v Kaloi [2004] DCR 128, para 28 (DC) Judge Roderick Joyce QC. 
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( c) Public interest and justice without a name 
(i) Can justice be done without a name? 
In Re Victim X the Crown argued they did not think there was more to be gained 
from publication of the victim' s name.
255 Hammond J found this unpersuasive and held 
that the name of the victim would have to be known for people to come forward
256 and to 
know "how the case was dealt with".
257 This raises the question of whether justice can 
still be done without publicising the name of the victim or witness. 
If the name of a victim or witness is suppressed it is unlikely the due process 
rights of an accused will be affected.
258 Justice can still be done. The media and public 
can still be in court. Witnesses and victims can be seen and heard by those present. The 
trial can still be covered. Only publication of material leading to their identification is 
precluded259 and the conduct of the trial, and success or otherwise of the defendant, "does 
not turn on this kind of thing".
260 Moreover, very often the public has no concern with 
the name of a victim or witness except for "a somewhat morbid curiosity" .
261 
(ii) Legitimate public interest or mere curiosity? 
A primary justification for Hammond J lifting the suppression order in Re Victim 
X was his finding that "the public is entitled to know and form its own views on what 
happened".262 However, it is often hard to find legitimate public interest beyond mere 
curiosity in the widespread publication of identifying particulars of a victim or witness
263 
255 Re Victim X, above n 44, para 40 (HC) Hammond J. 
256 The author notes however that Hammond J did not discuss whether a description that did not identify the 
victim could still achieve the same purpose. 
257 Re Victim X, above n 44, para 38 (HC) Hammond J. 
258 Delivering Justice fo r All, above n 4 318. 
259 Taylor v Attorney-General, above n 54, 680 Wild CJ. 
260 R v Socialist Worker Printers and Publishers Ltd, ex parte Attorney-General [1975] 1 All ER 142, 150 
(QB) Lord Widgery CJ. 
261 Ibid . 
262 Re Victim X, above n 44, para 38 (HC) Hammond J. 
263 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 34. 
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- "no doubt the incident is newsworthy and the trial is newsworthy, but what is the public 
interest in the identity of the victim or the victim's family?"264 
Knowing their identity will often not "add substantively to information about the 
crime in question."265 It may be that Hammond J equated public interest with the fact 
that the public were interested.266 This is further emphasised by the fact that neither X 
nor his family had courted publicity and may therefore especially be entitled to have their 
privacy respected. 267 While the distinction between genuine public interest and mere 
curiosity has been recognised in privacy 268 and family law, 269 this discussion, and 
whether it influences the balancing assessment of the factors for and against suppression, 
did not occur in Re Victim X 
3 Advantages of current approach 
The current approach does have advantages. Firstly, it accords well with the 
notion that everything ought to be on public record in criminal proceedings. 270 Open 
justice is paramount and there ought to be a very high threshold before names of victims 
and witnesses are suppressed. It also reinforces that openness requires participants in the 
criminal justice process to be more careful about what they say.271 The quality of the 
264 Paul Marcus "The Media in the Courtroom: Attending, Reporting, Televising Criminal Cases" (1982) 57 
Indiana LJ 235, 270. See also, Butler and Butler, above n 57, 338: " [T]he integrity of the justice system 
and the right to freedom of expression do not require the reporting of the full personal details of parties 
involved in Court proceedings (this includes the names of the accused in criminal trials) since the wellbeing 
of the parties and their families is of paramount importance." 
26 5 R v W (No 3) (2 December 2004) HC NEL CRI-2004-042-001663 , para 3 (HC) Goddard J. 
266 Fiona Jackson, above n 92, 24. 
267 Eric Barendt, above n 9, 315, where the author notes, in relation to victims, that "usually . . . the protection 
of privacy is thought more important in this context than the right of the press and other media to identify 
the complainant or the interest of the public in receiving that information." See also, R v W (No 2), above n 
35, para 17 Goddard J. 
268 R v W (No 2) , above n 35, para 27 Goddard J. See also, Hosldng v Runting, above n 33. 
269 Newspaper Publishers Association of New Zealand (Inc) v Family Court, above n 170, 352 Pankhurst 
and Chisholm JJ : "A distinction needs to be drawn between cases of mere curiosity and cases where the 
press seeks to publish information or comment about a matter of genuine public interest." See also, in a 
non-family law context, R vH, above n 171,489 Baragwanath J: " ln my judgment there is no relevant 
public interest or need to know that this man has been charged ... " 
270 Delivering Justice for All, above n 4, 318. 
27 1 R v Socialist Worker Printers and Publishers Ltd, ex parte Allorney-General, above n 260, 150 Lord 
Widgery CJ. 
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justice system is enhanced if participants know what they say, and who they are, is public 
information. This helps maintain public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of 
criminal proceedings.272 More practically, suppressing identity can sometimes make it 
difficult to publish evidence during a trial, which further restricts open justice.273 
However these advantages seem to merely reinforce the paramountcy and 
importance of open justice. They do not suggest the current approach to name 
suppression for victims and witnesses is the most suitable for the needs of these 
individuals, nor are they inconsistent with the possibility that a different approach should 
be adopted. Indeed a suitable approach could still achieve these advantages and not 
. . h 1 f 274 1mpmge t e goa s o openness. 
While it would seem that, reservations aside, Re Victim X is clear about the 
approach to victim and witness name suppression, there are many reasons to reconsider 
the approach. 
D Reasons for New Approach 
1 Differences 
There is little justification for treating witnesses, victims and defendants alike for the 
purposes of name suppression; witnesses are invariably there because of their public 
duty, while for victims it often means reliving a painful experience.275 
The current approach does not recognise that victims and witnesses are different 
from defendants. Publicity can unfairly impact witnesses and revictimise victims causing 
shame and humiliation, possible risks to safety, and adversely affect families and 
businesses.276 While the punitive function of publicity may be congruent with a high 
threshold for defendant name suppression, it seems unfair that victims and witnesses 
272 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 36. 
273 Ibid, 34. 
274 Delivering Justice for All, above n 4, 318. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 34. 
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should be held to this same standard and their privacy infringed through potentially 
intense media publicity.277 It would seemingly be a justifiable limitation on freedom of 
expression for victims and witnesses to be treated differently. Indeed that is the case in 
other CJA provisions.278 
Furthermore, Parliament has particularly recognised the umque position of 
victims in the VRA. 279 The VRA aims to "improve provisions for the treatment and 
rights of victims of offences"280 and provides that respect for their privacy is one of the 
rights of a victim. 281 It would seem inconsistent with the policy of this Act for the 
approach to name suppression for victims to be the same as the approach to those who 
perpetrated their victimisation. 
2 Justifications 
The justifications underlying open justice and the high threshold for defendant 
name suppression do not apply with the same force to victims and witnesses. This is 
because name suppression for victims and witnesses does not raise the same issues that 
arise in relation to name suppression for defendants. 282 Typically these are concerns such 
as the possibility of suspicion unfairly falling on others, the public interest in knowing the 
true character of the person seeking suppression, issues of public safety and the 
possibility of discovering further offending or victims and witnesses .283 While these may 
be genuine considerations pointing towards open justice and a high threshold for 
defendant name suppression, they do not apply at all, or at least not with the same 
277 Fiona Jackson, above n 92, 21 . 
278 For example, the special position of victims who give evidence in criminal cases is partially recognised 
in the Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 139 which provides for name suppression of victims of certain sexual 
offences. See also, Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 139(1AA) which was added to reinforce the protective 
nature of the section. 
279 Burrows and Cheer, above n 10, 338. 
280 Victims' Rights Act 2002, s 3. 
281 Victims ' Rights Act 2002, s 7. See also, Burrows and Cheer, above n 10, 338 . 
282 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 33. 
283 Suppression and Contempt, above n 37, 16-17. 
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force, 284 to victims and witnesses. This would suggest that holding victims and witnesses 
to the same threshold as defendants is inappropriate. 
The difficulty with the current approach is that it has a defendant in mind when it 
focuses on the requirement for "compelling reasons" to be shown to displace the 
presumption of open justice - it does not investigate whether there are any reasons to 
justify publication of the name of a victim or witness. 
285 
3 Encouraging victims and witnesses 
It is important to encourage victims and witnesses to participate in court proceedings. 
The comfort of knowing that particulars of their identity would not be published if there 
were reasonable grounds for such a request would indicate that the law recognised the 
value of their participation and had some flexibility with respect to their personal wishes 
as to name suppression .
286 
Victims and witnesses play an important role in the criminal justice system. 
However this role is difficult to perform. They face enough difficulties having to cope 
with the rigours of a trial, let alone the potential to feel revictimised and face intense 
public scrutiny. It is important to encourage and support not only those that are 
participants in the system already, but also those that may participate in the future. 
Victims and witnesses may be deterred from coming forward because of fears of 
name publication.287 For example, victims of domestic violence may feel shame and 
284 See, for example, Re Victim X, above n 44, para 40 (HC) Hammond J, where it is suggested that 
publication of the name of Victim X may bring others forward. However the author notes that Hammond J 
did not address whether a description that does not identify Victim X could still achieve the same purpose. 
285 Fiona Jackson, above n 92, 26. See al so, R v Geoffrey David Davis [1995) FCA 1321 , para 6 Wilcox, 
Burchett and Hill JJ: "There being no special circumstances requiring a departure from the general rule, 
there was no justification for permitting publication of the complainants' names in this case." It is also 
noted that victims are generally to be treated differently to defendants. 
286 Delivering Justice fo r All, above n 4, 319. 
287 See, for example, Eric Barendt, above n 9, 351: " [A] report by a popular newspaper or on television will 
have enormous impact on the privacy of the victim, and may well deter other women from reporting rape to 
the police ... There are in fact sometimes stronger arguments for restrictions on media reporting than there 
are for limits on access to the trial itself, even though these restrictions clearly engage the free speech rights 
of the press to report legal proceedings ." 
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humiliation which may be exacerbated by name publication.
288 They may be dissuaded if 
name suppression is difficult to obtain. Similarly, in R v Paterson Penlington J 
recognised that the potential for a witness to be victimised, before or after giving 
evidence, is an interference with the due administration of justice because it can "deter 
other people from coming forward and giving evidence frankly and fully and without fear 
of the consequences".289 Too high a threshold for name suppression can inhibit the 
ability of the court to provide victims and witnesses with adequate protection which may 
deter others from coming forward in fear of publication consequences. 
E Victim or Complainant? 
The author acknowledges that it may be imbalanced to label a complainant that 
appears before the court a victim at all stages of proceedings.
290 
The author also notes that arguably case law may suggest that comparatively a 
witness may have less cause than a complainant or victim to justify name suppression.
29 1 
Because witnesses appear to assist in the presentation of a case against a defendant to the 
court, it may be that in order for this case to be tested and a fair trial conducted, a witness 
should more readily be exposed to the full rigours of open justice.
292 A natural corollary 
may be that when a victim is also a witness they too may have less cause, than if they 
were a victim or complainant alone, to justify name suppression.
293 
288 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 34. 
289 R v Paterson [1992] 1 NZLR 45 , 50 (HC) Penlington J. See also, Attorney-General v Butterworth 
[1962] 3 All ER 326, 329 (CA) Lord Denning MR. 
290 See Part VI A Introduction. 
291 See Re Victim X, above n 44. 
292 In other words, to ensure that the defendant enjoys the full benefit of their right to a fair trial there may 
be more cause to suggest the name of the witness should not be suppressed from publication. It may be that 
psychologically cross-examination and other processes will be more fair (or effective) if the witness knows 
that their name may be published in a report of the proceedings. A counterargument to this could reiterate 
the actual effect of name suppression - see Parts VI C 2 ( c) Public interest and justice without a name; and 
IV F 2 A note on names: only publication is restricted and as the court is still open, arguably a witness can 
still be 'checked' (and the trial still be fair and open) by the presence of the public in the court room. 
293 See Re Victim X, above n 44; and Part VI C (a) Changed circumstances. Arguably the decision in Re 
Victim X may be able to be justified on this basis. 
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While it may be that until conviction a complainant should have no greater 
justification for name suppression than any witness (but that after conviction a victim 
should be accorded more protection), the author prefers a dynamic approach that makes 
an overall assessment at the time the application is made, as to whether suppression is 
justified in the circumstances. It may be that a different approach would discourage 
others from coming forward. 294 
F Possible Approaches 
The reluctance of the judiciary to modify the approach for victims and 
witnesses 295 leaves the ball in Parliament's court - a clear, transparent response is 
required. There are many possible approaches. 
I Law Commission 
The Law Commission has examined this issue a number of times.
296 While the 
terms of its recommendations may have varied, its recognition of the different 
considerations applicable to victims and witnesses has not changed. 
(a) Delivering justice report 
In 2004 the Commission recommended that "where a request for name 
suppression of a victim in criminal proceedings is made, that request should be granted 
unless it would not be in the interests of justice to do so."
297 It recommended the status 
b · • d C • ?98 quo e mamtame 1or witnesses.-
294 It is outside the scope of this paper to consider whether or not complainants, especially considering they 
are facing the rigours ofan open trial (even if publication of their name is restricted), are in most instances 
telling the truth. 
295 See, for example, Re Victim X, above n 44, (HC) para 42 Hammond J: " ... one would have thought that a 
parliamentary mandate for widespread change was required." 
296 See, for example, Delivering Justice for All, above n 4; and Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 
3. 
297 Delivering Justice for All, above n 4, 319. 
298 Ibid. 
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(b) Suppression issues paper 
In 2008 the Commission suggested that the approach to name suppression for 
victims and witnesses ought to be different to the approach to name suppression for 
defendants - open justice as the starting point but three grounds to justify suppression, 
where publication: endangers safety; would cause undue hardship to a victim or witness; 
or for any other reason would not be in the interests of justice.
299 
2 Canada 
Canada affords an example of a jurisdiction that specifically provides for victims 
and witnesses.300 The provision is clear and thorough, assisting the court in the exercise 
of its discretion by not only detailing the importance of open justice but also recognising 
the special considerations that apply to victims and witnesses.
301 
3 Evaluation and suggested provision 
It is clear the Law Commission recognises the different considerations applying to 
victims and witnesses would seem to demand and justify a different approach being 
adopted. 302 Of its suggestions, the 2008 proposal should be preferred. This is because 
while it recognises the different position of victims and witnesses, it also acknowledges 
the importance of open justice. 
299 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 35-36. 
30° Canadian Criminal Code RSC 2009 c C-34, s 486 .5. See Part X B Appendix Canadian Criminal Code, 
s 486.5 . This provision is particularly interesting given the great significance Canada places on the 
freedom of expression and its high threshold for suppression (or ' common law publication bans ' ) in other 
instances : see Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation [1994] 3 SCR 835 (SCC) and R v Mentuck 
[2001] 3 SCR 442 (SCC). 
301 Canadian Criminal Code RS C 2009 c C-34, s 486.5(7) . For example, whether there is a real and 
substantial risk that the victim or witness would suffer ignificant harm; whether the victim or witness 
needs the order to protect them from intimidation or retaliation: and society' s interest in encouraging the 
reporting of offences and the participation of victims and witnesses in the criminal justice process. 
302 Perhaps especially recognising the need for a different approach for victims. 
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However, it is suggested that the Canadian approach may be more meritorious 
and should provide the direction for reform. 303 This approach provides greater 
transparency and guidance in the exercise of the judicial discretion. 
The author suggests the following provision: 
Section 140D Court may prohibit publication of identifying particulars of 
complainants, victims and witnesses 
(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in any enactment, a court may make an order 
prohibiting the publication, in any report or account relating to any proceedings in 
respect of any offence, of the name, address or occupation of any complainant, 
victim or witness connected with the proceedings, or any particulars likely to lead to 
any such person ' s identification, if that court is satisfied that publication would-
(a) for any reason not be in the interests of justice; 
(b) endanger the safety of any person; or 
(c) cause undue hardship to the complainant, victim or witness. 
(2) In considering whether to make such an order, the court must recognise -
(a) that a primary objective in the administration of justice is to safeguard the public 
interest in open justice, and the consequential right of the news media to publish 
information relating to court proceedings; 
(b) the distinct place of complainants, victims and witnesses in the criminal justice 
process and the need to respect this position; 
( c) the right of a defendant to a fair and public hearing; and 
(d) the stage of the proceedings at which the application is made. 
(3) In considering whether to make such an order, the court shall consider -
(a) whether there is a real and substantial risk that the complainant, v1ct1m or 
witness would suffer significant and disproportionate harm if their identity were 
disclosed; 
(b) whether the complainant, victim or witness needs the order for their security or 
to protect them from intimidation or retaliation; 
(c) society's interest in encouraging the reporting of offences and the participation 
of complainants, victims and witnesses in the criminal justice process; 
(d) the Victims ' Rights Act 2002; 
(e) whether effective alternatives are available to protect the identity of the 
complainant, victim or witness; 
(f) the impact of the proposed order on the freedom of expression of those affected 
by it; 
(g) whether the public interest requires that the identifying particulars of the 
complainant, victim or witness not be suppressed; 
(h) the salutary and deleterious effects of the proposed order; and 
(i) any other factor that the judge or justice considers relevant at this stage of the 
proceedings. 
303 Indeed, some of the considerations detailed would seem to be consistent with principles that can be 
distilled from case law in New Zealand. Compare, R v Kaloi , above n 254, para 32 Judge Roderick Joyce 
QC and the suggestion that suppression may be warranted where victims or their families might be in 
physical jeopardy if the victim's identity was in the public arena, with Canadian Criminal Code RSC 2009 
c C-34, s 486.5(7)(c) where a factor to be considered is whether a victim or witness needs suppression to 
protect them from intimidation or retaliation . 
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( 4) The court may only make a suppression order if it is satisfied that in the 
circumstances there is a sufficient threat to the interests of justice, the safety of any 
person, or to the undue hardship to the complainant, victim or witness, to justify the 
making of the order in the particular case. 
G Conclusion 
There are many reasons to reconsider the approach to victim and witness name 
suppression. These individuals are different to defendants and the justifications 
substantiating the current approach are focussed on offenders rather than victims and 
witnesses. If victims and witnesses are to be encouraged to assist in the administration of 
justice they need to feel their dignity and privacy is respected and can be protected. The 
current threshold simply does not meet their needs.
304 A new, more transparent approach 
should be adopted; victims and witnesses deserve greater protection and respect. 
VII PENALTIES 
A Current Framework 
Breach of a suppression order granted under section 140 of the CIA is a strict 
liability offence. The offence will be proved unless the defendant can show, on the 
balance of probabilities, they have acted honestly and with all care that a reasonable 
person would take in the circumstances. 
305 In other words, a defence of honest and 
reasonable mistake or total absence of fault is available.
306 
A person who breaches a suppression order under section 140 1s liable on 
summary conviction for a fine not exceeding $1,000.
307 
304 Fiona Jackson, above n 92, 33. 
305 Karam v Solicitor-General (20 August 1999) HC AKL AP 50/98, 8 (HC) Gendall J. 
306 Police v News Media Auckland Ltd [1998] DCR 134, 139 (DC) Judge Nicholson QC. 
307 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 140(5). The penalties do vary slightly between the sections - a person who 
breaches, evades or attempts to evade an order made: under ss 138 (2)(a) or (b), 140, or 139(1) or (2) is 
liable on summary conviction for a fine not exceeding $1,000; under s 138(2)(c) may be dealt with as a 
contempt of court; and under s 139A(l ), in the case of a body corporate, is liable for a fine not exceeding 
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B Contempt 
The law of contempt is concerned with preservmg an impartial and effective 
justice system, and assessing the risk of interference with the administration of justice.308 
Generally it is aimed at responding to actions or statements that: "directly threaten the 
court or disobey its orders; compromise a fair trial; undermine the authority and integrity 
of the court; and/or attempt to dissuade people from recourse to the court".309 Particular 
breaches of suppression orders granted under section 140 may fit within any or all of 
these categories. 
While the CJA provides that a breach, evasion or attempted evasion of particular 
orders may be dealt with as a contempt of court,310 no such power is provided in section 
140, where punishment is only by fine. Notwithstanding this, it has been suggested that a 
deliberate breach may be treated as common law contempt, in addition to the statutory 
fine. 311 Moreover, section 401 of the Crimes Act 1961 and section 206 of the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957 both provide the court with the power to order that any person who 
wilfully, and without lawful excuse, disobeys any order of the court in the course of the 
hearing of any proceedings, be taken into custody and detained "until the rising of the 
court", and committed to prison for up to three months, or fined for up to $1000 for each 
offence.312 A flagrant and intentional breach of an order under section 140 may therefore 
give rise to statutory contempt under these provisions.313 
$5,000 and in the case ofan individual , for a fine ofup to $1,000 or a tenn of imprisonment not exceeding 
three months. 
308 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 70. 
309 Suppression and Contempt, above n 37, 22. 
31° Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 138(8). The author notes that the penalties under section 139A seem to be 
analogous to contempt too (albeit there is no specific mention of the word). 
311 Burrows and Cheer, above n 10, 350. 
312 Crimes Act 1961 , s 40l(l)(c); and Summary Proceedings Act 1954, s206(c): This may have only 
limited use as the provisions only apply to disobedience during the course of a proceeding. 
313 See also Suppression and Contempt, above n 37, 24 where it is noted that Berryman v Solicitor-General 
[2005] 3 NZLR 121, paras 43-44 (HC) Wild J appears to indicate that if a suppression order has already 
been defeated by others - ie, if the information is already in the public domain - contempt is unlikely. 
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C Adequacy and the Need for a Strong Deterrent 
In assessing the adequacy of a penalty it is important to consider the interests at 
stake. 314 Suppression orders are court orders which provide protection to the 
administration of justice and reduce the harm endured by victims, witnesses and 
defendants when justice so requires. 
315 These are extremely important functions and 
sometimes victims, witnesses and defendants - and the administration of justice - only 
h · £ · 31
6 ave one opporturuty or protection. 
While it is important to acknowledge the general (and admirable) adherence to 
name suppression orders by professional media organisations in New Zealand, 
317 the 
question of whether the current penalty regime provides an adequate deterrent to large 
media organisations faced with the temptation to publish suppressed details still remains 
- indeed the penalty has been described as "underwhelming"
318 and the High Court has 
urged Parliament to consider substantially increasing the fine so that prosecution is a 
"meaningful deterrent". 
319 
The need for a meaningful deterrent is not limited to just the professional media. 
It must be remembered that media organisations are not the only people that can be 
present in court or come into contact with suppressed information and potentially breach 
name suppression orders. In our modem society, where technology is rife and our ability 
to effortlessly impart and receive information from multiple sources increases, so to does 
the prospect of the general public breaching name suppression orders. The advent and 
burgeoning practice of user-generated content such as blogging on the internet provides 
further need for a clear and more meaningful deterrent to be adopted. As many varied 
314 Eric Barendt, above n 9, 325 where the author notes that while a serious penalty such as contempt may 
infringe the right to freedom of speech and of the press, "it has much Jess serious consequences than those 
which might flow from denial of the right to a fair trial." 
315 Police v News Media Auckland Ltd, above n 306, 141 Judge Nicholson QC. 
316 For example, fair trial rights of an accused: once the information is out, it is out and very difficult - if 
not impossible - to restore. 
3 17 Suppression and Contempt, above n 3 7, 21. 
318 Ibid, 20. 
319 Solicitor-General v Fai,fax New Zealand Ltd & Another (10 October 2008) HC WGN CIV 2008-485-
000705, para 138 (HC) Randerson and Gendall JJ. 
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groups of people may come into contact with suppressed information, it is especially 
important that provisions addressing penalties for transgression are specific and 
transparent so that all individuals can understand the consequences of disobedience. 
D Possible Form of a Strong Deterrent 
The current offence regime for breaches, evasion or attempted evasion of name 
suppression orders under section 140 ought to be reformed. 320 The current penalty of 
$1 ,000 is not a meaningful deterrent. Indeed this penalty is seemingly inconsistent with 
similar provisions in other legislation containing much higher penalties.321 Moreover, the 
lack of clarity around the position and availability of common law or statutory contempt 
is undesirable. The public and media need more certainty of the possible contempt 
actions arising from breach of name suppression orders. 
Reform in this area should be focussed on two needs: the need for meaningful 
penalties that recognise the significant interests that are protected by these orders; and the 
need for the consequences of offending to be specifically and transparently stated. 
Reform could be in the form of increased financial penalties and possible terms of 
imprisonment, a move away from strict liability towards a scale of tiered offences or a 
focus on knowledge and recklessness, higher penalties for corporate bodies, or a mixture 
of any of these. 322 
1 Knowledge and recklessness or tiered offences 
The punishment for disobeying a name suppression order could be dependent on 
the knowledge or recklessness of a person as to whether or not an order was breached. If 
320 The author notes that should the penalties in section 140 be altered, sections 138-139A of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985 ought to be similarly reformed (and perhaps similar provisions outside the Act too) . A 
consistent message must be sent to those who come into contact with suppressed information as to the 
consequences of disobeying these court orders . 
321 See, for example, Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, ss 240 and 263 and the Health Practitioners 
Competence Assurance Act 2003 , s 95 where the penalty for publication of a suppressed name is a fine of 
an amount not exceeding $25 ,000 and $10,000 respectively. 
322 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 72-75 
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an individual knowingly breaches a suppression order this could give rise to a harsher 
penalty or a contempt of court. A person could be liable for reckless disobedience if he 
or she appreciated that there was a substantial risk of a suppression order being in place 
and, having regard to all the circumstances known, it was unjustifiable to take that risk.
323 
This categorisation may better reflect the care that people must take in relation to court 
suppressed information. 
Another alternative may be the adoption of a tiered penalty prov1s10n that 
punishes both intentional and unintentional breaches. It has been suggested that this 
approach more adequately reflects possible levels of culpability. 
324 For example, in a 
digital age, an individual may intentionally breach a suppression order by publishing the 
name of a suppressed party on their internet blog, or may unintentionally breach a 
suppression order by copying this information from another website and publishing it 
agam. The level of culpability in these two situations is different and arguably the 
punishment should reflect this difference. A similar approach has been adopted in 
relation to anonymity orders in the Evidence Act 2006.
325 
Regardless of form, there should be a distinction between the penalties for a body 
corporate and an individual. This distinction is common in other penalty provisions - for 
example, it appears again in relation to anonymity orders in the Evidence Act 2006 
(within the tiered offence structure).
326 This division is necessary to acknowledge that, 
while both must be deterred, a body corporate has greater access to resources to ensure 
suppressed information is handled responsibly. Moreover, practically body corporate 
publishers may have greater publicity impact and reach than individual publishers. 
323 Ibid, 72. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Evidence Act 2006, s 119. 
326 Ibid. 
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2 Two important considerations 
The ability of media organisations to obtain accurate and timely information in 
relation to the terms, duration and scope of name suppression orders is crucial for the 
reporting aspect of open justice. The media frequently complain that access to this 
information varies between registries and is difficult to obtain.327 There is a significant 
need for the reasons and terms of each name suppression order to be stated clearly and for 
an accessible record of the details of these orders to be kept. This will ensure that 
journalists - whether or not they are in court at the time an order is issued - are able to 
fully understand and check the terms of orders in force. Moreover, this becomes all the 
more necessary if the penalties incurred for breaching suppression orders mcrease -
parties must easily be able to determine what information is suppressed. 
(a) Terms and reasons 
There is currently no statutory requirement to give reasons for a suppression 
order. 328 However it has been considered desirable to do so and in most instances a 
failure to provide reasons will amount to an error of law.329 Despite this, reasons are 
sometimes still not provided. 330 
The author is of the op1mon that there should be a statutory requirement to 
provide reasons for, and clearly state the terms of, any suppression order granted. 
Reasons must be provided as they assist the public in their understanding of why a 
suppression order has been considered appropriate. 331 The terms must be stated so the 
restrictions on the ability of the media and public to use this information can be easily 
determined. Moreover, a requirement to provide reasons and state the terms of an order 
would: act as a discipline for judges to ensure they consistently consider all relevant 
327 See, for example, Television New Zealand (News & Current Affairs) Submission on Suppressing Names 
and Evidence (submission to the New Zealand Law Commission, 2009) 12; and Fairfax Media Submission 
on Suppressing Names and Evidence (submission to the New Zealand Law Commission, 2009) 14. 
328 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 49 . 
329 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd, above n 22, para 76-82 Elias CJ for the Court. 
330 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 48 . Television New Zealand, above n 327, 11. 
331 Fairfax Media, above n 327, 13 . 
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factors; help ensure any order is the least infringement on open justice; provide an 
accessible body of precedent for future decisions; and assist in the determination of 
appeals.332 
If penalties are increased - especially where contempt is possible 
333 
- it is 
essential reasons and terms are stated: it must be clear what is permitted and what is 
prohibited.334 
(b) Register335 
A concern of the media is that they are unable to check the terms of a suppression 
order and, if not present in court when it is made, may not be aware that an order even 
exists.336 The author believes that a national register must be developed to alleviate this 
issue, especially if penalties are to be increased. 
3 South Australia 
South Australia appears to have struck an appropriate balance. Section 70 of the 
Evidence Act 1929 (SA) provides that disobedience of a suppression order is punishable 
by contempt of court, provided the court by which the order was made has the power to 
punish for contempt. 337 Whether or not the court has that power, an individual that 
disobeys a suppression order is guilty of an offence.
338 The maximum penalty in the case 
332 Ibid. See also Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd, above n 22, para 76-82 Elias CJ for the Court . 
333 Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd, above n 12, 453 Lord Diplock: " [W)here courts, in the 
interests of the due administration of justice, have departed in some measure from the general principle of 
open justice no one ought to be exposed to penal sanctions for criminal contempt of court for failing to 
draw an inference or recognise an implication as to what it is permissible to publish about those 
proceedings, unless the inference or implication is so obvious or so familiar that it may be said to speak for 
itself." 
334 Attorney General v Punch Ltd [2003) 1 AC I 046, 1055 (HL) Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. 
335 It is outside the scope of this paper to consider the advantages, disadvantages and form of a potential 
national register of suppression orders. For example, it may that the register is made publicly available or 
access is limited to accredited media organisations and whether it should take the form of an electronic 
database (potentially with the ability to send email alerts, perhaps for a nominal fee) or physical record. 
336 Suppressing Names and Evidence, above n 3, 53. 
337 Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 70(1 ). 
338 Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 70(1 a). 
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of a natural person is $10,000 or imprisonment for two years, and in the case of a body 
corporate, a fine of $120,000. Section 70(2) provides that a person shall not be 
proceeded against for both a contempt of court and a summary offence. 
Moreover, the reasons and terms of each suppression order must be specified339 
and a register is maintained of all this information. 340 The register is made available to 
the public and 'authorised news media representatives' are notified electronically of new 
· h · 341 entries to t e register. 
4 E l . d d . . 342 va uatwn an suggeste proviswn 
There are two reform options - section 140(5) could be amended and the penalty 
increased or a new approach could be favoured. The author is of the opinion that a new 
approach should be adopted that moves away from strict liability and more adequately 
reflects the potential for varying levels of culpability. The author prefers a tiered penalty 
regime which distinguishes between penalties for a body corporate and an individual. 
This approach is favoured because it provides greater clarity as to what the levels of 
culpability (and associated penalties) are, and distinguishes between body corporate 
publishers - with greater resources and publication impact and reach - and individual 
publishers. 
While the South Australian approach provides good direction in terms of the 
degree and types of penalties to be applied to a body corporate and individual, it does not 
provide clarity as to the varying levels of culpability. 
The author suggests the following provision is more suitable: 
339 Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 69A(8). 
340 Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 69A(8)-(l l). 
341 Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 69A(l l ). While it is outside the scope of thi s paper, the author notes that it 
could be suggested that making the register freely available to all members of the public could, to some 
degree, defeat the order itself. 
342 This part of the paper is limited to an assessment of the penalty regime; no further analysis is made of 
the matters of registers and reasons (see Part VII D 2 Two important considerations). 
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Section 140E Offences 
(1) If a person, with knowledge of an order prohibiting publication of identifying 
particulars made under section 140A, l 40B, 140C or 140D, intentionally breaches, 
evades, or attempts to evade that section, the person commits an offence and is liable 
on conviction on indictment, -
(a) in the case of an individual , to a fine not exceeding $30,000 or to a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding 2 years : 
(b) in the case of a body corporate, to a fine not exceeding $300,000. 
(2) If a person contravenes section 140A, 140B, 140C or 140D, and that contravention 
does not constitute an offence against subsection (1) , the person commits an offence 
and is liable on summary conviction, -
(a) in the case ofan individual, to a fine not exceeding $10,000: 
(b) in the case ofa body corporate, to a fine not exceeding $100,000. 
(3) Nothing in this section limits the power of any court to punish any contempt of court. 
( 4) A person shall not, in respect of the same act or default, be proceeded against under 
this section both for a contempt of court and an offence under subsection (1) or (2). 
E Conclusion 
The present penalty regime for breach of a suppression order under section 140 is 
inadequate. In a modem media and technological age, it simply does not provide a 
meaningful deterrent. The penalties must be increased to reflect the significant interests 
that are protected by these orders. Any reform must aim to clearly state all possible 
consequences of offending - particularly the availability of an action in contempt. The 
public and media need more certainty. Moreover (especially if penalties increase) it is 
imperative that there be a requirement for the reasons and terms of each name 
suppression order to be stated clearly and an accessible record of these details to be kept. 
It must be clear at all times what is permitted and what is prohibited. 
It is imperative that this area of name suppression be promptly reformed. 
343 
343 Indeed the author notes (while already done within some States in Australia) there is a significan
t call 
led principally by Victorian Deputy Premier and Attorney-General Rob Hulls for the establishm
ent of an 
electronic National Register of Suppression Orders in Australia. This suggestion was proposed 
to the 
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General in July 2008 and in November 2008, the Federal Atto
rney-
General announced the commitment of the states and territories of Australia to develop further th
e 
framework for a national electronic register of suppression orders. See Premier of Victoria Aust
ralia 
www.premier.vic.gov.au (last accessed 27 September 2009); and Australia ' s Right to Know "Re
port of the 
Review of Suppression Orders and The Media ' s Access to Court Documents and Information" (
13 
November 2008) 84 . 
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VIII CONCLUSION 
Name suppression is a unique area of law requiring the court to balance a number 
of conflicting rights set amongst complex personal circumstances. It is a difficult balance 
to strike. Section 140 confers a broad discretion to suppress the name of any person 
accused or convicted of an offence, or of any other person connected with the 
proceedings. No further guidance is provided to assist the court in the exercise of its 
discretion. While a level of flexibility must always be maintained, it is time that the 
legislature resolved a number of issues and provided more direction to assist the court. 
The public and media demand more consistency and transparency. 
Defendants will always be unpopular. However in some instances, particularly 
during the pre-trial stage of proceedings, name suppression for a defendant may be 
justified. But it must be remembered the process is dynamic, suppression at one stage of 
a case may not be justified at another. While there are a number of well established 
principles in name suppression, there is also a notable amount of inconsistency and 
divergence in the approach to the exercise of the discretion. Particularly the relevance of 
the presumption of innocence and stage of proceedings to the assessment continue to be 
contentious issues. These issues need to be clarified. 
Section 140 also provides protection to third parties and victims and witnesses. 
Whether or not the phrase "connected with the proceedings" in section 140 was intended 
to have a wide or narrow interpretation, there are many sound reasons to justify that a 
court should have the ability to prohibit, when appropriate, publication of the name of a 
third party who is only connected to proceedings by virtue of a close relationship to a 
defendant. Moreover, it is time that the unfairness inherent in having the same 
considerations and threshold apply to an application for a suppression order, regardless of 
whether the applicant is a victim, witness or defendant is recognised. 
It is imperative that the penalty regime for disobeying a suppression order be 
reformed. The current regime is inadequate and does not reflect the significant interests 
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protected by these orders. A more meaningful deterrent must be enacted which clearly 
states the consequences of disobedience. 
Name suppression does not herald the end of open justice. In some instances it 
will be a justified limitation to restrict publication of the name of a party. However, open 
justice is so essential to our criminal justice system that publication should always be the 
norm and suppression must be the exception. In order to ensure the courts strike the 
appropriate balance it is necessary for the legislature to provide further guidance to assist 
the court in the exercise of its discretion. The provisions suggested in this paper provide 
that direction. While the winds of open justice should blow through the workings of the 
court, publicity in some instances is not the price of justice. 
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X APPENDIX 
A Criminal Justice Act 1985, ss 138, 140 
Section 138 Power to clear court and forbid report of proceedings 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of any other enactment, 
every sitting of any court dealing with any proceedings in respect of an offence shall be open to 
the public . 
(2) Where a court is of the opinion that the interests of justice, or of public morality, or of the 
reputation of any victim of any alleged sexual offence or offence of extortion, or of the security or 
defence of New Zealand so require, it may make any one or more of the following orders: 
(a) An order forbidding publication of any report or account of the whole or any part of -
(i) The evidence adduced; or 
(ii) The submissions made: 
(b) An order forbidding the publication of the name of any witness or witnesses, or any name or 
particulars likely to lead to the identification of the witness or witnesses: 
(c) Subject to subsection (3) of this section, an order excluding all or any persons other than the 
informant, any Police employee, the defendant, any counsel engaged in the proceedings, and 
any officer of the court from the whole or any part of the proceedings. 
(3) The power conferred by paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of this section shall not, except where the 
interests of security or defence so require, be exercised so as to exclude any accredited news 
media reporter. 
(4) An order made under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section -
(a) May be made for a limited period or permanently; and 
(b) If it is made for a limited period, may be renewed for a further period or periods by the court 
and 
(c) If it is made permanently, may be reviewed by the court at any time. 
(5) The powers conferred by this section to make orders of any kind described in subsection (2) of this 
section are in substitution for any such powers that a court may have had under any inherent 
jurisdiction or any rule of law; and no court shall have power to make any order of any such kind 
except in accordance with this section or any other enactment. 
(6) Notwithstanding that an order is made under subsection (2)(c) of this section, the announcement of 
the verdict or decision of the court (including a decision to commit the defendant for trial or 
sentence) and the passing of sentence shall in every case take place in public; but, if the court is 
satisfied that exceptional circumstances so require, it may decline to state in public all or any of 
the facts , reasons, or other considerations that it has taken into account in reaching its decision or 
verdict or in determining the sentence passed by it on any defendant. 
(7) Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 
$1 ,000 who commits a breach of any order made under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of 
subsection (2) of this section or evades or attempts to evade any such order. 
(8) The breach of any order made under subsection (2)(c) of this section, or any evasion or attempted 
evasion of it, may be dealt with as contempt of court. 
(9) Nothing in this section shall limit the powers of the court under sections 139 and 140 of this Act to 
prohibit the publication of any name. 
Section 140 Court may prohibit publication of names 
(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in any enactment, a court may make an order prohibiting 
the publication, in any report or account relating to any proceedings in respect of an offence, of the 
name, address, or occupation of the person accused or convicted of the offence, or of any other 
person connected with the proceedings, or any particulars likely to lead to any such person ' s 
identification. 
(2) Any such order may be made to have effect only for a limited period, whether fixed in the order or 
to terminate in accordance with the order; or if it is not so made, it shall have effect permanently. 
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(3) If any such order is expressed to have effect until the determination of an intended appeal, and no 
notice of appeal or of application for leave to appeal is filed or given within the time limited or 
allowed by or under the relevant enactment, the order shall cease to have effect on the expiry of 
that time; but if such a notice is given within that time, the order shall cease to have effect on the 
determination of the appeal or on the occurrence or non-occurrence of any event as a result of 
which the proceedings or prospective proceedings are brought to an end. 
( 4) The making under this section of an order having effect only for a limited period shall not prevent 
any court from making under this section any further order having effect either for a limited period 
or permanently. 
( 4A) When determining whether to make any such order or further order in respect of a person accused 
or convicted of an offence and having effect permanently, a court must take into account any 
views of a victim of the offence, or of a parent or legal guardian of a victim of the offence, 
conveyed in accordance with section 28 of the Victims ' Rights Act 2002. 
(5) Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 
$1,000 who commits a breach of any order made under this section or evades or attempts to evade 
any such order. 
B Canadian Criminal Code, s 486.5 
(1) Unless an order is made under section 486.4, on application of the prosecutor, a v1ct1m or a 
witness, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the 
victim or witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way if 
the judge or justice is satisfied that the order is necessary for the proper administration of justice. 
(2) On application of a justice system participant who is involved in proceedings in respect of an 
offence referred to in subsection 486.2(5) or of the prosecutor in those proceedings, a j udge or 
justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the j ustice system 
participant shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way if the 
judge or justice is satisfied that the order is necessary for the proper administration of justice. 
(3) An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the 
course of the administration of justice if it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the 
information known in the community. 
(4) An applicant for an order shall 
(a) apply in writing to the presiding judge or justice or, if the j udge or justice has not been 
determined, to a judge of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction in the judicial district where 
the proceedings will take place; and 
(b) provide the notice of the application to the prosecutor, the accused and any other person 
affected by the order that the judge or justice specifies. 
(5) An applicant for an order shall set out the grounds on which the applicant relies to establish that 
the order is necessary for the proper administration of justice. 
(6) The judge or justice may hold a hearing to determine whether an order should be made, and the 
hearing may be in private. 
(7) In determining whether to make an order, the judge or justice shall consider 
(a) the right to a fair and public hearing; 
(b) whether there is a real and substantial risk that the victim, witness or justice system 
participant would suffer significant harm if their identity were disclosed; 
(c) whether the victim, witness or justice system participant needs the order for their security or 
to protect them from intimidation or retaliation; 
(d) society' s interest in encouraging the reporting of offences and the participation of victims, 
witnesses and justice system participants in the criminal justice process; 
(e) whether effective alternatives are available to protect the identity of the victim, witness or 
justice system participant; 
(f) the salutary and deleterious effects of the proposed order; 
(g) the impact of the proposed order on the freedom of expression of those affected by it; and 
(h) any other factor that the judge or justice considers relevant. 
(8) An order may be subject to any conditions that the judge or justice thinks fit. 
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(9) Unless the judge or justice refuses to make an order, no person shall publish in any document or 
broadcast or transmit in any way 
(a) the contents ofan application; 
(b) any evidence taken, information given or submissions made at a hearing under subsection (6); 
or 
(c) any other information that could identify the person to whom the application relates as a 
victim, witness or justice system participant in the proceedings. 
C Evidence Act 1929 (SA), ss 69A, 70, 71B 
69A-Suppression orders 
(1) Where a court is satisfied that a suppression order should be made-
(a) to prevent prejuclice to the proper administration of justice; or 
(b) to prevent undue hardship-
(i) to an alleged victim of crime; or 
(ii) to a witness or potential witness in civil or criminal proceedings who is not a party to 
those proceedings; or 
(iii) to a child, the court may, subject to this section, make such an order. 
(2) If a court is considering whether to make a suppression order (other than an interim suppression 
order), the court-
(a) must recognise that a primary objective in the administration of justice is to safeguard the 
public interest in open justice and the consequential right of the news media to publish 
information relating to court proceedings; and 
(b) may only make a suppression order if satisfied that special circumstances exist giving rise to a 
sufficiently serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice, or undue 
hardship, to justify the making of the order in the particular case. 
(3) Where an application is made to a court for a suppression order, the court may, without inquiring 
into the merits of the application, make such an order (an interim suppression order) to have 
effect, subject to revocation by the court, until the application is determined; but if such an order is 
made the court must determine the application as a matter of urgency and, wherever practicable, 
within 72 hours after making the interim suppression order. 
(4) A suppression order may be made subject to such exceptions and conditions as the court thinks fit 
and specifies in the order. 
(5) Where an application is made to a court for a suppression order-
(a) any of the following persons, namely: 
(i) the applicant for the suppression order; 
(ii) a party to the proceedings in which the suppression order is sought; 
(iii) a representative of a newspaper or a radio or television station; 
(iv) any person who has, in the opinion of the court, a proper interest in the question of 
whether a suppression order should be made, is entitled to make submissions to the 
court on the application and may, with the permission of the court, call or give 
evidence in support of those submissions; 
(b) the court may (but is not obliged to) delay determining the application to make possible or 
facilitate non-party intervention in the proceedings under paragraph (a)(iii) or (iv). 
(6) A suppression order may be varied or revoked by the court by which it was made, on the 
application of any of the persons entitled to make submissions by virtue of subsection (5)(a). 
(7) On an application for the making, variation or revocation of a suppression order-
(a) a matter of fact is sufficiently proved if proved on the balance of probabilities; 
(b) if there appears to be no serious dispute as to a particular matter of fact , the court (having 
regard to the desirability of dealing expeditiously with the application) may-
(i) dispense with the taking of evidence on that matter; and 
(ii) accept the relevant fact as proved. 
(8) If a court makes a suppression order, the court must-
(a) as soon as reasonably practicable forward to the Registrar a copy of the order; and 
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(b) except in the case of an interim suppression order-within 30 days, forward to the Attorney-
General a report setting out-
(i) the terms of the order; and 
(ii) the name of any person whose name is suppressed from publication; and 
(iii) a transcript or other record of any evidence suppressed from publication; and 
(iv) full particulars of the reasons for which the order was made. 
(9) If a court orders the variation or revocation of a suppression order, the court must as soon as 
reasonably practicable forward a copy of the order to the Registrar. 
(lO)The Registrar-
(a) will establish and maintain a register of all suppression orders; and 
(b) will, immediately after receiving a copy of a suppression order, or an order for the variation or 
revocation of a suppression order, enter the order in the register; and 
(c) will, when an order is entered in the register, immediately transmit by fax, email or other 
electronic means notice of the order to the nominated address of each authorised news media 
representative. 
(11) The register will be made available for inspection by members of the public free of charge during 
ordinary office hours. 
(12) Without limiting the ways in which notice of a suppression order, or an order varying or revoking 
a suppression order, may be given, the entry of such an order in the register is notice to the news 
media and the public generally (within and outside the State) of the making and terms of the order. 
(13)In this section-
authorised news media representative means a person-
(a) who is nominated by a member of the news media to be the member's authorised 
representative for the purpose of receiving notices under subsection (lO)(c); and 
(b) who has given the Registrar a notice specifying the representative's nominated address for the 
receipt of notices under subsection (lO)(c); and 
(c) who has paid the relevant fee or fees (which may consist of, or include, periodic fees) fixed by 
the regulations; 
nominated address of a nominated representative means the fax number, email address or other 
address for the receipt of electronic communications nominated by the representative as the address to 
which notices may be sent to the representative by the Registrar under subsection (1 O)(c); 
Registrar means a person to whom the functions of the Registrar under this section are assigned by the 
Attorney-General. 
70-Disobedience to orders under this Division 
(1) If a person disobeys an order under this Di vision and the court by which the order was made has 
power to punish for contempt, the person is guilty of a contempt of the court. 
(la) If a person disobeys an order under this Division, whether or not the court by which the order was 
made has power to punish for contempt, the person is guilty of an offence. 
Maximum penalty: 
(a) in the case of a natural person-$10 OOO or imprisonment for 2 years; 
(b) in the case of a body corporate- $120 OOO. 
(2) A person shall not, in respect of the same act or default, be proceeded against under this section 
both for a contempt of court and a summary offence. 
71B-Publisbers required to report result of certain proceedings 
(1) Where-
(a) a report of proceedings taken against a person for an offence is published; 
(b) the report identifies the person against whom the proceedings have been taken or contains 
information tending to identify that person; 
(c) the report is published before the result of the proceedings is known; 
(d) those proceedings do not result in conviction of the person to whom the report relates of the 
offence with which he was charged, the person by whom the publication is made shall , as 
soon as practicable after the determination of the proceedings, publish a fair and accurate 
report of the result of the proceedings with reasonable prominence having regard to the 
prominence given to the earlier report. 
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Maximum penalty: 
(a) in the case of a natural person- $10 OOO; 
(b) in the case ofa body corporate- $120 OOO. 
(2) A person required under subsection (1) to publish a report of the result of proceedings may apply 
to the Supreme Court for directions in relation to the manner in which he should comply with that 
subsection. 
(3) Where-
(a) a report of proceedings taken against a person for an offence is published; 
(b) the report identifies the person against whom the proceedings have been taken or contains 
information tending to identify that person; 
(c) the report is published after the result of the proceedings is known; 
(d) those proceedings did not result in conviction of the person to whom the report relates of the 
offence with which he was charged, the person by whom the publication is made shall include 
prominently in the report a statement of the result of the proceedings. 
Maximum penalty: 
(a) in the case ofa natural person- $10 OOO; 
(b) in the case of a body corporate- $120 OOO. 
(4) In thi s section-
proceedings includes, in relation to an offence, the laying of a charge of the offence. 
D Author-suggested Provisions, ss 140A, 140B, 140C, 140D, 140E 
Section 140A Publication of the identifying particulars of a person charged with an 
offence before first court appearance prohibited 
Except as otherwise expressly provided in any enactment, publication of the name, 
address, occupation or any identifying particulars of a person charged with an offence 
before they appear in court is prohibited unless that person consents to publication. 
Section 140B Court may prohibit publication of identifying particulars of defendant 
(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in any enactment, a court may make an order 
prohibiting the publication, in any report or account relating to any proceedings in 
respect of any offence, of the name, address or occupation of any defendant, or any 
particulars likely to lead to any such person ' s identification, if that court is satisfied 
that publication would -
(a) for any reason not be in the interests of justice; 
(b) cause undue hardship to the complainant or victim; or 
(c) cause a risk of prejudice to a fair and impartial trial. 
(2) In considering whether to make such an order, the court must recognise -
(a) that a primary objective in the administration of justice is to safeguard the public 
interest in open justice and the consequential right of the news media to publish 
information relating to court proceedings; and 
(b) the stage of the proceedings at which the application is made. 
(3) In considering whether to make such an order, the court shall consider -
(a) whether there is a real and substantial risk that the defendant would suffer 
significant and di sproportionate harm if their identity was disclosed; 
(b) whether effective alternatives are available to protect the identity of the 
defendant; 
(c) the impact of the proposed order on the freedom of expression of those affected 
by it; 
(d) in pre-conviction (or acquittal) applications, the right of the defendant to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law; 
(e) whether the public interest requires that the identifying particulars of the 
defendant not be suppressed; 
93 
(f) the salutary and deleterious effects of the proposed order; and
 
(g) any other factor that the judge or justice considers rele
vant at this stage of the 
proceedings. 
(4) The court may only make a suppression order if
 it is satisfied that in the 
circumstances there is a sufficient threat to the interests 
of justice, to a risk of 
prejudice to a fair and impartial trial, or to the undue hardsh
ip to the complainant or 
victim, to justify the making of the order in the particular cas
e. 
Section 140C Court may prohibit publication of identif
ying particulars of third 
parties 
(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in any enactment, a c
ourt may make an order 
prohibiting the publication, in any report or account relatin
g to any proceedings in 
respect of any offence, of the name, address or occupat
ion of any third party 
connected with the proceedings, directly or by virtue of a r
elationship of sufficient 
connection with a party to the proceedings, or any particul
ars likely to lead to any 
such person 's identification, if that court is satisfied that publ
ication would -
(a) for any reason not be in the interests of justice; 
(b) endanger the safety of any person; or 
(c) cause undue hardship to the third party. 
(2) In considering whether to make such an order, the court 
must recognise -
(a) that a primary objective in the administration of justice i
s to safeguard the public 
interest in open justice, the right to a fair and public
 hearing, and the 
consequential right of the news media to publish informati
on relating to court 
proceedings; and 
(b) the stage of the proceedings at which the application is m
ade. 
(3) In considering whether to make such an order, the court 
shall consider -
(a) whether there is a real and substantial risk that the t
hird party would suffer 
significant and disproportionate harm if their identity were di
sclosed; 
(b) whether effective alternatives are available to protect 
the identity of the third 
party; 
( c) the impact of the proposed order on the freedom of expr
ession of those affected 
by it; 
(d) whether the public interest requires that the identifying
 particulars of the third 
party not be suppressed; 
(e) the salutary and deleterious effects of the proposed order
; and 
(f) any other factor that the judge or justice considers relevant 
at this stage of the 
proceedings. 
(4) The court may only make a suppression order if 
it is satisfied that in the 
circumstances there is a sufficient threat to the interests of j
ustice, the safety of any 
person, or to the undue hardship to the third party, to justify
 the making of the order 
in the particular case. 
Section 140D Court may prohibit publication of id
entifying particulars of 
complainants, victims and witnesses 
(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in any enactmen
t, a court may make an order 
prohibiting the publication, in any report or account relatin
g to any proceedings in 
respect of any offence, of the name, address or occupatio
n of any complainant, 
victim or witness connected with the proceedings1 or any particulars likel
y to lead to 
any such person's identification, if that court is satisfied that 
publication would -
(a) for any reason not be in the interests of justice; 
(b) endanger the safety of any person; or 
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(c) cause undue hardship to the complainant, victim or witness. 
(2) In considering whether to make such an order, the court must recognise -
(a) that a primary objective in the administration of justice is to safeguard the public 
interest in open justice, and the consequential right of the news media to publish 
information relating to court proceedings; 
(b) the distinct place of complainants, victims and witnesses in the criminal justice 
process and the need to respect this position; 
(c) the right ofa defendant to a fair and public hearing; and 
(d) the stage of the proceedings at which the application is made. 
(3) In considering whether to make such an order, the court shall consider -
(a) whether there is a real and substantial risk that the complainant, v1ct1m or 
witness would suffer significant and disproportionate harm if their identity were 
disclosed; 
(b) whether the complainant, victim or witness needs the order for their security or 
to protect them from intimidation or retaliation; 
(c) society's interest in encouraging the reporting of offences and the participation 
of complainants, victims and witnesses in the criminal justice process; 
(d) the Victims ' Rights Act 2002; 
(e) whether effective alternatives are available to protect the identity of the 
complainant, victim or witness; 
(f) the impact of the proposed order on the freedom of expression of those affected 
by it; 
(g) whether the public interest requires that the identifying particulars of the 
complainant, victim or witness not be suppressed; 
(h) the salutary and deleterious effects of the proposed order; and 
(i) any other factor that the judge or justice considers relevant at this stage of the 
proceedings. 
( 4) The court may only make a suppression order if it is satisfied that in the 
circumstances there is a sufficient threat to the interests of justice, the safety of any 
person, or to the undue hardship to the complainant, victim or witness, to justify the 
making of the order in the particular case. 
Section 140E Offences 
(1) If a person, with knowledge of an order prohibiting publication of identifying 
particulars made under section 140A, 140B, 140C or 140D, intentionally breaches, 
evades, or attempts to evade that section, the person commits an offence and is liable 
on conviction on indictment, -
(a) in the case of an individual , to a fine not exceeding $30,000 or to a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding 2 years: 
(b) in the case of a body corporate, to a fine not exceeding $300,000. 
(2) If a person contravenes section 140A, 140B, l 40C or 140D, and that contravention 
does not constitute an offence against subsection (1), the person commits an offence 
and is liable on summary conviction, -
(a) in the case ofan individual , to a fine not exceeding $10,000: 
(b) in the case of a body corporate, to a fine not exceeding $100,000. 
(3) Nothing in this section limits the power of any court to punish any contempt of court. 
( 4) A person shall not, in respect of the same act or default, be proceeded against under 
this section both for a contempt of court and an offence under subsection ( 1) or (2). 
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